Object Relations Theory and the Rorschach: an Examination into Impaired Perceptions of Humanness by Picker, William Richard
1 
Object Relations Theory and the Rorschach: 
An Examination into Impaired 
Perceptions of Humanness 
By 
WILLIAM RICHARD PICKER 
" Bachelor of Arts 
Fairleigh Dickinson University 
Teaneck, New Jersey 
1978 
Master of Science 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwate;, Oklahoma 
1981 
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College 
of the Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPY 
July, 1984 

Object Relations Theory and the 
An Examination into Impaired 
Perceptions of Humanness 
Thesis Approved: 
7 Thesis Adviser 
ii 120G343 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction ..... 
Object Relations Theory 
The Development of Object Relations 
Impaired Object Relations and Psychopathology 
Psychoanalytic Theory and 
Borderline Pathology 
The Work of Otto Kernberg 
The Borderline Experience 
Borderline Etiology 
Splitting .... 
Splitting and the Therapeutic 
Experience ..... . 
The Assessment of Object Relations 
Borderline Rorschach Responses 
Empathy, Object Relations, and the 
Borderline Phenomena 
A Projective Approach to the Study of 
Object Relations 
Statement of Purpose 
The Question of System Choice 
The Decision for Exner 
Response Selection ..... 
Object Relations Development and the 
Structural Summary 





























III. RESULTS ... 
Reliability 
Validity 
Rating Nonhuman Relationships 

















Reliability and Validity 
Some Post-Hoc Thoughts Regarding 
the MOA Scale ....... . 
Clinical Use of the Exner System 
Structural Indices and Object Relations 
Indices of Humanness ..... . 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Page 









APPENDIX A - MUTUALITY OF AUTONOMY WITHIN PORTRAYED RELATIONSHIPS 
IN RORSCHACH IMAGERY SCALE . . . . 81 
APPENDIX B - AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL TASK. 86 
APPENDIX C - RATING SCALE FOR THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL TASK 90 
APPENDIX D - STAFF EVALUTATION OF WARD BEHAVIOR 94 
v 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Reliability in Terms of Percent Agreement . 44 
2. Intercorrelations Between Mutuality of 
Autonomy Measures . . . . . . . . . . 46 
3. Reliability in Terms of Percent Agreement .......... 50 
4. Intercorrelations Between Mutuality of 
Autonomy Measures • • • • • • • • • • • 5 3 
5. Intercorrelations Between Mutuality of 
Autonomy Measures Across Response Selection 
Criteria ... 
6. Intercorrelations Between OVERMOA, RMOA, 
and General Structural Summary Indices 
7. Intercorrelations Between OVERMOA AND RMOA with 
Human and Human like Content 
8. GOODM Intercorrelations for Critical5 0 . . . 
9. GOODM Intercorrelations for Critical4 0 . . . 
10. GOODH Intercorrelations for Critical5 0 . . . 
11. GOODH Intercorrelations for CriticaJ.4 0 . . . 
vi 
• • • • • • • 5 5 
. . .. 56 
Human 
. . . . 57 
. . . . . . . 59 
. . . . . . . 60 
. . . . . . . 61 




Recognizing the considerable lag that the psychodiagnostic 
assessment of object relations remains behind modern analytic theory, 
the present study examined attempts at correcting this deficit. A 
review of the literature addressed the importance of object relations to 
the understanding of the borderline phenomena. A recent scale that 
measures object relations development using the thematic content of the 
Rorschach was the focus of investigation. Reliability and validity 
measures were replicated, using the Exner Comprehensive System of 
Rorschach administration and scoring. The object relations scale was 
compared to indices of the structural summary, including several newly 
created indices that focused specifically on object relations. 
Object Relations Theory 
The development of the human capacity to perceive others as 
separate from oneself, yet maintaining the same "human'' qualities has 
become an important issue in modern clinical psychology and psychiatry. 
"Object Relations Theory" regards the acquisition of the capacity for 
the processes of mental representations of "humanness" as being of 
central importance to personality development. This structural theory 
examines the ''internal basis for an individual's capacity to experience 
human relatedness" (Urist, 1980, p. 821). 
Present day object relations theory may be thought to have evolved 
from developmental psychology (e.g. Piaget, Werner), developmental 
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analytic theory (Ego Psychology - e.g. Hartmann, Kernberg, Kohut, 
Jacobson, Mahler, Spitz), and the part of the British school of analytic 
theory that has emphasized early structural capacity (e.g. Fairbairne, 
Klein). While no unified theory of object relations can be claimed, a 
central core of understanding prevails. Briefly, the theory maintains 
that healthy development requires the accurate perception of other 
people (the "object", distinguished from the "self"). Successful 
interpersonal relations (which might be thought of as the crowning 
achievement of psychological development) requires the capacity for 
these correct perceptions. The internal component of such perception, 
mental representations, are "expressions of cognitive development which 
occur as the consequence of the interaction between the innate 
capacities of the individual and experiences in reality" (Blatt, 
Chevron, Quinlan, & Wein, 1981, p. 1). These experiences between the 
self and others are internalized and serve as an experience base (the 
development of internal "cognitive structures"), which is drawn upon in 
later environmental interaction. 
The construct of a "real" perception requires clarification, as 
three levels of "real" can be brought to mind. At the pre-perceptual 
level, the environment exists in a form that has not yet peen structured 
in consciousness through the psychophysiological processes by which 
organisms "know',' their world. In a sense, it is the "raw data." The 
modifications made by the processes of perception is the initial level 
of "reality'' to which humans have access. This second level encompasses 
"real" information that is received prior to being "tainted" with 
experience. It is the result of the processes of perception before 
higher psychological functions give additional meaning to the incoming 
sensory data. Finally, the internal representations that result from 
the modifications by the individual's psyche on information from this 
previous level yields "realness", or "reality", for that person. 
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The attempt at understanding the experiencing of reality requires 
its recognition as a complex, dynamic interaction. Not only are all 
levels of the psyche, including present internal representations, 
structures, fantasy, and conscious ·as well as unconscious content 
involved in the reception of perceptual reality, but they are also 
modified by such a process. To experience relationships, the individual 
psychologically manipulates perceptual reality in a fashion similar to 
past experiences with this organizational process. This requires a 
coordinated functioning of psychological processes which "act not only 
on 'real' perceptions of 'real' relationships, but ... must (additionally) 
organize the affectively charged interweaving of psychic content" 
(Urist, 1980, p.821). This understanding is the perceptual basis for 
object relations theory. The significance of the extra-perceptual 
contributions to this process is inversely related with (normal) 
psychological development, with the maturing infant clearly drawing more 
heavily upon such factors than perceptual ("level two") reality. 
The developing perceptual processing takes place within a social 
world. The "various levels of mental representations initially develop 
within the context of important, need-gratifying, interpersonal 
relationships and then generalize as cognitive structures which are 
expressed in all cognitive-affective endeavors" (Blatt et al. 1981, p. 
1). The impact of experience on the developing structural capacity for 
object relations is similar to all developmental theories in its 
assumption of a maturational timetable. 
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Since these processes begin development immediately upon birth, it 
is the mother/primary caretakerl who forms the infant's environment and 
their modifying relationship which be~omes the crucial issue of 
concern. These concommitant developmental modifications of early growth 
and its dynamic relationship within the caretaker relationship involves 
the continually changing experience of self and object. This change in 
the child requires appropriately modified changes in the.responding 
caretaker. Winnicott (1960) describes the situation: 
One half of the theory of the parent-infant relationship 
concerns the infant, and is the theory of the infant's 
journey from absolute dependence, through relative 
dependence, to independence .... The other half of the 
theory ... concerns changes in the mother that meet the 
specific and developmental needs of the infant. (p. 588) 
The developmental basis for object relations theory may be 
summarized as follows. The infant is not only completely dependent upon 
the caretaker for physiological requirements, but for most psychological 
requirements as well. The adequate development of the infant requires a 
"good enough environment", complete with appropriate nurturance and 
frustration. Continuous modification is essential for empathic 
caretaking, as the infant's needs are continually changing. If this 
compatibility is "adequate enough", internalization (structure 
formation) becomes possible. "With the help of 'in-tune' parenting, the 
child gradually acquires the internal capacity to handle functions that 
had previously been performed by the parent'' (Urist, 1980b, p. 82i). 
The hungry infant who initially cries until the perception of feeding 
1 Modern analytic literature has maintained the use of the term 
"mother" to imply anyone who functions in the capacity of initial 
"significant other." In an effort to remove the generic use of sexually 
specific nouns (Publication Manual, 1983, p. 43), the use of the word 
"caretaker" will hereafter be used without implication of differences in 
the relationship. 
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learns that the caretaker brings relief. The perceived image of the 
caretaker begins to acquire similar meaning (i.e. is cathected with 
positive libidinal energies) and further development leads to the mental 
representation of the caretaker (with neither the process of feeding nor 
the feeder being present) sufficing to eliminate the anxiety of 
starvation. 
To understand the dynamic complexities of object relations 
development, a depiction of healthy mature adult functioning seems 
appropriate. Many apparent paradoxes must be transversed and 
integrated. The perceiver must realistically assess many desirable and 
undesirable qualities in others, and yet synthesize these into a 
representation of a wholistic individual. This synthesis must take into 
account the many settings in which the individual functions, the impact 
of relationships, as well as the varying influence of one's own need 
state. These images must remain even at the expense of generating 
considerable anxiety, as in the case of acceptance ~f negative 
qualities, such as unreliability, in someone upon whom the perceiver 
must rely. This becomes critical when such reliance is crucial to the 
perceiver's integrity. This internal representation must be enduring, 
and the continuous flood of often contradictory data must make an 
ever-decreasing modification on the representation (as each datum 
contributes an ever smaller percentage to the overall information on the 
individual). 
This delicately integrated representation must be understood as 
having many qualities such as needs, desires, and modes of functioning 
similar to other objects. And yet, the uniqueness of each object, in 
the face of so many, similarities must not be denied. 
Self representation must remain equalJ.y enduring and integrated. 
This is a particularly difficult task which requires acceptance of 
negative self-attributes (self limitations) that may realistically 
jeapordize the person's success in relationships. 
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To achieve whole self- and object representations, the healthy 
adult must accept the precarious, ambiguous, and anxiety-provoking 
"realities" of life. To be sure, such anxiety evokes defense 
mechanisms. But mature defenses are successful because they allow the 
person to negotiate life with minimal distortion, something ill-afforded 
by impaired object relations. 
The Development of Object Relations 
Thrust into the world, the newborn infant has neither the equipment 
with which to perceive, nor the psychological references with which to 
compare its perceptions. There is no inner world, no outer world, no 
me, no them, no boundaries, no self, and no object (Freud's views of 
psychological birth following physical birth (1926/1959, p. 138) is 
prevalent amoung theoreticians, with Bion (1977) and Laing (1976) 
expressing exception). This "tabula rasa'' has a considerable distance 
to travel before achieving the mature object relations development 
previously described. "With development, object representations become 
increasingly differentiated, integrated, and accurate. They proceed 
from amorphous, 'global representation, to a somewhat differentiated 
emphasis on part properties, to representations which are highly 
articulated and integrated, and closely correspond to reality" (Blatt et 
al., 1981, p. 4). 
Blatt (1981) presents the most systematized stages of object 
relations development, and will be presented here for purposes of 
clarification. The description of the newborn infant previously 
described is that.of a "prerepresentational, preobjectal stage." This 
is a true boundaryless state, with no differentiation "between 
pleasurable sensations and the object providing the satisfaction." The 
need-satisfying object is part of the "diffuse, global, affective, 
sensory, physiological experience" (p. 5). 
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With development, there begins the initial recognition of the 
object as somehow being separate from the self, but such a level of 
perception remains grossly underappreciative of the qualities of the 
object. Here, need gratification is perceived as coming from the 
object, and the object is a source of pleasure because of its function 
in need gratification .. There is no distinction between the function and 
the person. This first stage, the Sensorimotor-Pre-Operational stage, 
yields a_perception of an object that is differentially impoverished. 
"The object is (libidinally) cathected at the moment of need 
gratification" (p. 5), and the need gratifier/need gratification becomes 
important for the infant. 
The caretaker provides need gratification in a variety of 
environments and during varied internal states of the baby, and these 
repeated experiences, along with continued physical maturation to allow 
use of such experience, contribute to increasing differention of the 
object. The behavioral concommitants of the first mental 
representation, that of searching for the object, appears. Perceptual 
constancy becomes prevalent, and the child has entered the second stage, 
Concrete-Perceptual Object Representation. Here, the object is 
recognized "independent of action or context ... (the object is) an entity 
in its own right, with a variety of functions and actions, and a 
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constant affective involvement with the object is maintained independent 
of frustration~gratification'' (p. 6). Behaviorally, the child 
recognizes the object in a variety of contexts, and imitation begins, 
"but the representation is a concrete, literal, fixed, perceptual 
totality which is not broken down into separate componants" (p. 6). 
As the object representation differentiates, part-properties of the 
whole become perceptible and are used as symbols for the object. Like 
the representations themselves, the symbols becomes increasingJ.y complex 
and abstract. The Iconic Object Representation stage brings 
considerable growth in abstraction and integration of the increasingly 
complex mental representation of the object. However, this essential 
integration is unable to process contradictary characteristics. 
This transitional stage is composed of two subphaseq, the first 
being the External Iconic. The representation is "based on concrete 
sign rather than an abstract symbolization of the object'' (p. 7). As 
the representation shifts from being dependent upon manifest features of 
the object to one based on more "internal abstract part-properties such 
as values, thoughts, and feelings" (p. 7), the child enters the Internal 
Iconic subphase. But throughout the Iconic Representation stage, nuance 
is lost, and representations are "based on extreme or v~vid 
part-properties ... often hostile, aggressive, and overidealized, idyllic 
features" (p. 7}. Thus, the representations are considerably fragmented 
and unintegrated, lacking the cohesion and integration of later 
representations. Herein lies the psychological setting for the 
approprate use of splitting, a defensive functioning which, if retained 
in later life, becomes the pathological hallmark, major defense 
mechanism, and a major liablity of the borderline patient (see later 
9 
text). Surprisingly, Blatt does not address this crucial pathological 
outgrowth in his discussion of object relations development. 
So far, object relations has developed from a unitary, 
undifferentiated representation, with function and person 
indistinguishable, to an increasingly more complex collection of often 
conflicting part-properties. The last stage, that of Conceptual. 
Representation, reintegrates these disparate part-properties, resulting 
in a representation that is whole, complex,· and appreciative of the many 
subtleties required to synthesize a psychological structure that does 
justice to the multi-faceted object. 
Conceptual representations are based on inner form and 
structure and are removed from ordinary nonreflective 
perception of manifest aspects of the object. The object 
is represented as a fully independent entity with 
specific and enduring characteristics, functions, values, 
and feeling, only some of which are relevant in any 
immediate situation .... The actual object is not needed to 
maintain (or perpetuate) the representation. It is now 
possible to have evocative memory of objects and events 
outside the perceptual field by means o~ images, signs, 
thoughts, and symbols, and anticipatory representations 
of things not previously perceived. (p. 7-8) 
Certainly, object relations development continues to grow and 
refine past this period of early childhood that corresponds with 
separation-individuation. Language, experience, and capacity for 
abstraction continues to mature and contribute to the child's 
representations, just as the child's interpersonal world moves beyond 
his/her parents to the relationships of later childhood, adolescence, 
and adulthood. But, with successful development, a level of structure 
is achieved that i~ qualitatively different than previous object 
relations, and further growth a refinement of this object relations 
plateau. 
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Impaired Object Relations And Psychopathology 
Object relations theory maintains that incompletely internalized 
whole self and object representations leave an individual without the 
psychological "prerequisites" to successfully negotiate interpersonal 
relationships. Such faulty development, theoretically either from a 
"less than adequate" upbringing, or an organic suceptibility leading to 
the person's experiences of their upbringing as "less than adequate", is 
held as being the contributor to as well as result of the severe 
psychopathologies. Global, gross distortions in such psychological 
components removes the capacity to even approximate "adequate" human 
functioning. This corresponds with severely impaired development of 
whole self and object representations, le~ding to psichotic disorders. 
Adequately developed object relations theoretically yields "neurotic" 
disorders in clinical populations. Inadequate development beyond the 
level of psychotic functioning therefore leads to the borderline 
disorders. Such psychopathology does not manifest the ubiquitous 
deterioration of psychotic populations, but tends to display behavior 
dsyfunctioning specific to interpersonal relationships. The Borderline 
Personality Disorder (301.83, DSM-III, 1980, p. 321) exemplifies such 
difficulties. "The central organizational failure in pathological 
narcissism (a feature of borderline conditions - Blanck & Blanck, 1979, 
p. 193) is an impairment in the developing capacity for reality testing 
in the circumscribed area of self-object relations" (p. 18~). Patients 
with this incomplete development yield such deficits due to the "need to 
live in the immediacy of interaction ... they search for replication of 
pri~ary object experience" (p. 197). 
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Psychoanalytic Theory and Borderline Pathology 
For the modern psychoanalytic therapist and theoretician, 
borderline psychopathology is presently of primary importance. Just as 
Freud expounded upon hysteria as the central theory-deriving pathology 
during the early evolution of psychoanalytic theory, the borderline has 
emerged to occupy the position. "Oedipus has been replaced by 
Hamlet ... as the mythical prototype of our period" (Sugarman & Lerner, 
1980, p. 12). 
Significant debate has taken place regarding how borderline 
pathology should be theoretically approached. Is it a specific disorder 
or a realm of disorders? Does the borderline patient show a stable and 
consistent (i.e. predictable and repetitive, and not the psychologically 
healthy attributes generally afforded by these terms) character 
disorder, or is it a less severe psychosis, manifesting greater 
adaptation to the world than is usually attributed to that level of 
functioning? Is borderline pathology primarily a disorder of ego 
functioning, or more specifically, that of object relations? Whether 
such pathology should be approached descriptively, or with 
psychoanalytic understanding of structural ·and dynamic etiology has 
produced considerable work. 
The work of Otto Kernberg. While many names are associated with 
the current borderline research and theory, (Blanck & Blanck, 1979; 
Kohut, 1974, 1978; Masterson, 1981), perhaps the analyst whose 
contributions have made the greatest impact upon theory and therapy with 
the borderline is Otto Kernberg. The label "borderline" has produced 
considerable problems, initially emerging as a vague descriptor of 
pathology between neurosis and psychosis. As the understanding of such 
pathology grew more precise, so has the use of the terminology. 
Kernberg maintained "the term Borderline PersGnality Organization, 
rather than 'borderline states' or other terms, more accurately 
describes these patients who do have a specific, stable, pathological 
personality organization; their personality organization is not a 
transitory state fluctuating between neurosis and psychosis" (1967, p. 
641-642). Rather, borderline is seen "as a description of a certain 
range of ego functioning on the continuum of adaptation from psychosis 
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to normality" (K. Smith, 1980, p. 60). 
be used for the present study. 
It is this definition that will 
Kernberg maintains that a structural analysis is necessary for 
understanding the borderline personality organization. Briefly, the 
Kernbergian school holds four categories for structural differential 
diagnosis: l)non-specific ego-weakness, including limited impulse 
control and anxiety tolerance, the latter often appearing as 
free-floating and separate .from any anxiety-producing stimulus; 2)shifts 
toward primary process thinking, particularly in less structured 
situations, such as psychological testing; 3)reliance on specific 
primitive defenses (predominately splitting and projective 
identification); and 4)pathology of internalized object relations. It 
is the importance of the borderline personality organization to the 
understanding of object relations theory, and visa-versa, that makes 
their mutual study necessary. 
The Borderline Experience 
The impaired object relations development of the borderline leads 
to an overwhelming and simultaneous need to both control and maintain a 
distance from the object. The inner experience of such pathology places 
13 
such patients in a no-win situation. The object is perceived as being 
both essential and devastating for one's own existence. The tremendous 
need of such a potentially harmful object produces the characteristic 
engulfment/abandonment dilemma of the borderline personality 
organization. As the borderline becomes emotionally close to another 
person, there is a fear of losing one's identity, individuality, or 
autonomy. The borderline responds by pulling back, only to find 
him/herself isolated and alone. The unstable relationships of the 
borderline are checkered by such periods of in~ense closeness and 
distant aloofness. The diffuse, free-floating anxiety associated with 
this pathology becomes understandable in this light. 
Depression appears to be another common experience for the 
borderline, although it is thought to be of a primitive nature. 
Characterized as "anaclitic", these patients experience dysphoria amidst 
the imagery of helplessness and object loss. Their mental 
representations may be "insufficient to maintain a sense of contact with 
the object ... in its absence ... (leadirig to) a desperate need to deny 
object loss and seek immediate and direct replacement (Blatt, Wein, 
Chevron, & Quinlan, 1979, p. 389). Whereas the borderline suffers with 
anaclitic depression and fears loss of the object, this is contrasted 
with "introjective depression" arid a fear of the loss of the love 
(acceptance, approval) of the object. In this latter, more 
developmentally mature depression, more typical themes of guilt and 
perceived failure abound. 
A discussion of the borderline experi~nce of social functioning 
requires an introduction. Appreciation for the dynamic interplay of the 
components of this disorder is needed for an understanding of the 
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diagnosis and object relations. Each of the four Kernbergian structural 
categories for understanding the borderline phenomena are simultaneously 
cause and effect for the other three. The borderline's belief systems 
manifest patterns of functioning which further contribute to the 
original belief systems. The following description of borderline 
functioning should be viewed in a similar dynamic interplay. 
Impoverished self-esteem is a universal component of the disorder. 
The attempted application of causality, such as whether such limited 
esteem breeds social dysfunction, or that environmental feedback of 
genuine rejection as a result of limited interactive capacities 
manifests a reduction in self-worth, misses the point. Both are true. 
The borderline's percept of othe~s is likely to be shallow, having 
the capacity to process only the most noticeable of personal traits. 
"An individual's experience of others will be as differentiated or 
varied as are the internal representations with which he can match them 
up'' (Hatcher & Krohn, 1980, p. 300). The experience of ambivalence is 
generally absent from their functioning and there is "little sense of 
genuine interpersonal encounter" (Sugarman, 1980, p. 50). They may 
perceive people as selfish, exploitive, 6r lacking concern about their 
best interests, and may react with considerable grandiose ideation 
and/or deprecation for others, presenting a self-sufficient and "loner" 
facade. Alternatively, they may respond with consuming concern or 
immature dependence in their interactions. They may have rigid belief 
systems regarding others (e.g. "women are treacherous and represent 
potential danger") or pathological rules for "effective functioning" 
(e.g. "I must act exactly like others to be accepted" - brilliantly 
caricatured in the 1983 Woody Allen movie ''Zelig"). There is often a 
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desperate feeling of being alone or empty; accompanied by maladaptive 
efforts to "fill the void." It is important to recognize that Kernberg 
and others view the borderline personality organization as a ''level of 
ego organization in which several personality dispositions exist" (K. 
Smith, 1980, p. 60), and not a personality type, per se. 
Relationships are characterized by instability and explosiveness. 
Absent are the quiet joys, the experience of content, and the mundane 
pleasures of healthy genital relationships. Instead, emptiness and 
despair commands a heightened level of intensity for both pleasure and 
pain. Such interpersonal functioning becomes critical to and exemplary 
of the important and intense relationship of therapy. "Turbulent 
transferences/countertransferences (are the) sine qua non of treatment" 
(Gorney & Weinstock, 1980, p. 1680. Typical characteristics of the 
borderline transference include "premature intensity of the transference 
feelings ... (an) explosive, rapidly shifting nature, the lack of impulse 
control in regard to the affects in the transference, (and) the 
weakening of reality testing in connection with these feelings" 
(Kernberg, 1966, p. 238). For the neuroses, the process of transference 
is a gradual unfolding as a systematic regression develops within the 
1 therapy setting. Transference with borderlines occurs extremely fast, 
lacking any period of increasing intensity or intermediate structure, 
such as non-spe6ific, pre-parental projections. Instead, the borderline 
patient may exhibit immediate transference manifestations of early 
conflicted object relations. It is likely that such ego states will be 
"split", with both components presented with the transference. Thus, 
well developed, yet completely opposite transferences (representing the 
presence of simultaneous, but apparently paradoxical ego states as a 
result of splitting) can occur. Consecutive therapy sessions can 
therefore display a fully positive, idolizing transference followed by 
the most angry of negative transferences. It is not unusual for such 
rapid oscillations to occur within a single session. 
Borderline Etiology 
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Pre-Oedipal pathology finds its origins during the course of 
separation-individuation development. Theoretically, the borderline has 
sucessfully negotiated Mahler's second stage of development, that of 
symbiosis. The resultant object relations development yields relatively 
differentiated self from object representations. Such fluid boundaries 
of schizophrenia are therefore absent from borderline functioning. 
In varying degrees, the synthetic-fusion process of rapproachment 
does not occur for the borderline. Environmentally, rapproachment may 
be the most delicate period for the developing child's caretaker. Given 
the previous feedback that the child is becoming more autonomous and 
less burdensome during the practicing subphase of 
separation-individuation (the "child's love affair with the world", the 
subphase preceding rapproachment), the caretaker must be exquisitively 
sensitive to the toddler's rapidly changing needs. During 
rapproachment, new anxieties appear with the acquisition of newfound 
independence. The toddler needs to repeatedly ''check-in" with the 
caretaker, "refueling" with external supplies of esteem. Behaviorally, 
the toddler is seeking additional physical contact, soothing, and verbal 
encouragement, which may mistakenly be perceived as regression by the 
caretaker. Patience, reassurance, and stability must come from the 
caretaker at this time, a potentially difficult task precisely at the 
point in maturation when he/she may have perceived the burden of 
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child-rearing as lessening. Conversely, the child's demonstration of 
independence may be a tremendous source of disappointment, particularly 
to the caretaker who derives a disproportionate amount of self-esteem 
and identity from his/her functioning in that role. Excessive, 
empathically-failing discouragement from seeking support, or from 
striving for independence (both integrally linked to the caretaker's own 
dynamics) at such a crucial developmental time period will theoretically 
impact the child's emerging personality. 
The resultant object relations from "out-of-tune" parenting lacks 
the integration and synthesis of the prevously described "healthy" 
rapproachment. The aggressive, selfish, and sadistic qualities inherent 
in all individuals is a self-image that cannot be tolerated without 
mature object relations, as such "bad" attributes cannot be tempered by 
the more desirable natures of mankind. Good must be maintained separate 
from the bad for both self and object internalized images, as important, 
need-fulfilling significant others become overly threatening if their 
negative qualities cannot be similarly tempered. This task is made 
di_fficult by the continuous environmental feedback that no one has all 
positive or negative qualities. 
What the borderline failed to achieve ... is the 
integration of his self- and object representations, 
which are kept polarized by the intense emotions by which 
they are invested. Because he cannot neutralize these 
intense emcitions, his self- and object representations 
remain in a primitive and unintegrated state. (Sugarman & 
Lerner, 1980, p. 28) 
The borderline is left to experience ''rapid oscillations between 
idealization and deprication with a failure to take into account 
realistic aspects and features of the object'' (Lerner & Lerner, 1980, p. 
258). This accounts for the differential diagnostic quality of the 
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primitive defense mechanism of the borderline personality organization, 
the maintenance and dependence upon splitting. 2 What was once a normal 
and necessary developmental stage due to the infant's perceptual as well 
as affective-cognitive mechanisms becomes a maladaptive defensive 
strategy for the adult who must negotiate the social world. 
Splitting 
As we have seen, the developing ego matures from minimal perceptive 
capacities to an intermediary stage with appreciation for, and 
representations of part-properties of the object. The part-properties, 
and the introjections and early identifications associated with them are 
clearly divided into the realms of "good" and "bad" as a result of 
multiple determinants. Initially, the separation into good and bad 
objects is simply the result of the immature ego - things that are 
dissimilar (to the infant's fledgling ego capacities) are dissimilar. 
But this passive process quickly becomes actively enhanced. The child's 
perceptual capacities develop faster with respect to his/her.abililties 
of synthesis and integration. Thus, as the baby begins to realize that 
nurturance and gratification come from the same object as does 
frustration, it is caught in the dilemma of being unable to handle this 
highly abstract construct of multi-faceted humanness. 
What originally was a lack of integrative capacity is 
used defensively by the emerging ego in order to prevent 
the generaiizations of anxiety and to protect the ego 
core built around positive introjections (introjections 
and identifications established under the influence of 
libidinal drive derivatives). This defensive division of 
the ego, in which what was at first a simple defect in 
2 certainly, splitting serves as the differential diagnostic defense 
for the borderline, but its lack of adaptation for a world requiring 
integration produces a self-limiting effect. "The shifting, unstable, 
nature of defensive functioning ... more accurately defines the borderline 
ego than any particular defense" (W. Smith, 1980, p. 159). 
integration is then used actively for other purposes, is 
in essence the mechanism of splitting. (Kernberg, 1975, 
p. 25) 
Like all defensive mechanisms, splitting attempts to prevent the 
experience of anxiety. During the full use of the mechanism, negative 
introjections can he projected outward. Thus, not only can the "good" 
object remain untarnished by his/her "bad" qualities, but the 
unacceptable self componants 'are rejected as well. Lacking the 
capacities to integrate both good and bad, the infant distorts reality 
enough to keep the good and. "throw away" the bad. 
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Kernberg suggests the time frame for such "normal" use of splitting 
to first appear at 3-4 months, reach a peak during the following months, 
and gradually extinquish toward one year of age (1966, p. 245). At that 
time, repression and the related "higher" level defenses such as 
reaction-formation and isolation becqme established. This represents a 
qualitative shift in ego functioning, where the mature ego defends 
against drive derivatives by banishing them into the unconscious. 
Splitting works by consciously keeping apart conflicting libidinal and 
aggressive introjects. "The drive derivative ... attains full emotional, 
ideational, motor consciousness, but is completely separated from other 
segments of the conscious experience" (Kernberg, 1975, p. 26).3 While 
repression serves to enhance the whole self-representation, splitting 
3A note on isolation appears warrented. This defense, more properly 
called isolation of affect, belongs with the group of repression-based 
mechanisms even though it may superficially appear similar to that of 
splitting. The affect and the ideation of the drive derivative remain 
isolated (hence the name) from each other in consciousness. In 
splitting, "there is a complete and simultaneous awareness of an impulse 
and its ideational representation in the ego. What are completely 
separated from each other are complex psychic manifestations, (each) 
involving affect, ideation, subject and behavioral manifestations" 
(Kernberg, 1966, p. 236). 
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functions to break it into polar parts (Klein, 1952). This latter 
psychological state of affairs is acceptable to the psyche of the 
infant, whose immature ieality testing will not provide a continuous 
assault of stimuli to confront this mental split, or whose environment 
does not require stable or consistent functioning. But the pathological 
persistence of splitting in an adult will result in obvious 
liabilities. 
Splitting and the therapecitic experience. The previously described 
transference manifestions of the borderline, one of oscillating, 
intense, disparate emotional states creates considerable difficulty for 
the therapist with the present understanding of the inadequate 
development of object relations and the reliance on splitting. Attempts 
by the therapist to discuss these alternating affective states results 
in considerable anxiety (often more than the patient can therapeutically 
tolerate). However, each state can be dealt with separately without the 
production of anxiety, as neither is unconscious (which requires the 
more developed defense of regresiion). It is the attempt to link the 
two, and directly thwart the function of splitting, that produces the 
anxiety. 
Encorporating the other two structural categories of the 
borderline, non-specific ego weakness (in particularly, limited impulse 
control and the ~apacity to delay gratification) and shifts toward 
primary proces thinking (enhanced by the less structured setting of 
therapy) results in the following therapeutic picture: 
The borderline patient's vulner~bility consists of 
latent, desperate aloneness and panic, which he may 
experience when his primitive rage begins to emerge in 
his relations with important people. This rage may 
appear in treatment when equally primitive longings to be 
held and nurtured surface and are frustrated by the 
realities of the therapeutic situation .... 
Developmentally, the furious borderline patient has 
regressed to a period where a sense of object constancy 
is not solidly established and the capacity to evoke the 
sustaining image of nurturant figures is lost. At the 
height of regression, the patient's ability to recognize 
previously valued aspects of the therapist, even though 
he is in the same room with the patient, may disappear. 
(Adler, 1977, p. 307-308) 
The Assessment Of Object Relations 
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While it is true that incompletely developed object re-lations leads 
to impaired interpersonal behavior, its assessment does not examine such 
behavioral problems alone. A dynamic understanding of both the disorder 
and its etiology is needed, as many different psychological states may 
produce similarly appearing behavioral manifestations. Rather, the 
evalution must be concerned with the individual's psychological 
functioning, particularly the intrapsychic activity that is invoked by 
interpersonal ideation. This activity involves affectively charged 
conscious and unconscious content concerning the self, the object, and 
the relationship between them. Equally important is the organization of 
such content within the individual's psyche. 
When a person is asked to spend an hotir immersing himself 
in a field of impressions where amorphousness prevails 
and where strange and even alien forms may appear, he 
will set in motion a reparative process the aim of which 
is to replace formlessness with reminders of the palpably 
real world. He primes himself to recall, recapture, 
reconstitute his world as he knows it, with people, 
animals and things which fit naturally into the ingrained 
experiences around which he has learned to structure his 
phenomenal world. (Mayman, 1967, p. 17) 
Inherent to the use of the Rorschach, or any projective test, 
1 
is 
the assumption that the test subject's responses parallel some aspect(s) 
of their psychological life. The traditional tool of the analyst, the 
Rorschach seems particularly well suited for the examination of object 
relations. Generally considered the most ambiguous of the projective 
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test stimuli (other than the blank card on the TAT), the responses "bear 
the imprint of (the subject's) formative interpersonal history" (Mayman, 
1967, p. 18). 
The inseparability of the study of object relations and that of 
borderline functioning again becomes evident. Incompletely developed 
object relations does not exist.independent of the corresponding 
psychiatric population. 
Making generalizations about borderline testing is a difficult task 
due to the nature of the pathology itself. "Because bordeiline is a 
structural diagnosis referring to a level of personality organization in 
many different character styles, (a portion of the test results) will 
depend on the character style of the patient in question" (Sugarman, 
1980, p. 43). 
Nonetheless, the Rorschach appears to be particularly well-suited 
for testing borderline patients. Traditional testing indicates that 
neurotic patients remain intact throughout both structured (unambiguous) 
and unstructured (ambiguous) tasks, while schizophrenic groups perform 
poorly on both. Borderline patients tend to perform differentially, 
being able to adapt well to structured tasks, but revealing considerable 
pathology that is both qualitatively and quantitatively different from 
th~ schizophrenic group in unstructured testing. The "projective pull 
of the Rorschach blots elicits from them their deepest level of 
pathology" (Gorney and Weinstock, 1980, p. 185). 
Borderline Rorschach Responses 
Pathology of internalized object relations produces projective test 
themes commensurate with the interpersonal functioning and psychological 
life previously discussed as symptomatic for the borderline. Rigid, 
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"black or white" percepts are given, with little capacity to generate or 
tolerate constructs that have paradoxical componants. Ambivalence is 
absent, creating too much anxiety. Again, test indices of limited 
self-worth and dysphoric affect ar·e common, and compensatory 
charactorological themes result. This may take the form of extensive 
narcissism with inordinate self-valuation or preoccupation, or 
conversely, themes of worthlessness. Total self-reliance or nihilistic 
independence may be portrayed, while productions indicating an absence 
of autonomy and pathological dependence upon others may likewise appear. 
Interpersonal themes may have an arbitrary or artificial flavor, and are 
likely to be presented in a shallow fashion unappreciative for the 
complex psychological world of the participants. 
More undefended, less displaced themes may also be produced, such 
as object loss and resultant despair or decompensation, or primitive 
imagery of symbiotic merger. Symbolic difficulties with separation-
individuation may also be present (Kwawer, 1980). "The blots may be 
experienced as merged with the self, ~o that they need to be 
omnipotently controlled or destroyed" (Gorney & Weinstock, 1980, p. 
185). 
Empathy, object relations, and the borderline phenomena. The 
examination of empathy is critical to object relations, the borderline 
phenomena, and their assessment. This highly abstract construct 
theoretically holds whole, fully internalized self and object 
representations as a prerequisite. It requires a temporary and 
controlled identification with another, a "regression in the service of 
the ego." Empathy commands a view from a vantage point of someone else, 
and an appreciation for dissimilar experiences. It is a connection with 
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another human being. 
These descriptions of empathy do not sound dissimilar from the most 
primitive wishes of the borderline, and yet there are important 
differences. While self boundaries are loosened during the empathic 
experience, it serves to facilitate the human interaction, and 
restoration is fully within the control of the individual. The 
distinctiori of self and other is never lost; rather, greater 
understanding is enhanced. The boundary losses as well as the fantasies 
of fusion and closeness service the narcissistic deprivations of the 
borderline, while empathy requires enough narcissistic supplies as to 
make it independent of need state. 
The narcissistic person (a characterological type of the 
borderline personality organization) may sometimes seem 
to empathize deeply and respond intensely to another 
person, but this closeness usually proves to be an 
essentially selfish act aimed at closing an intolerable 
gap between self and other. The narcissistic person may 
be perceptive and adroit in his interpersonal 
relationships, but this is not empathy. (Mayman, 1967, 
p. 20) 
Rorschach evidence for the capacity for empathy has generally 
focused on human content and human movement responses ("H" and "M", 
respectively). However, iii. a fashion similar to the confusion between 
borderline functioning and true empathy, pathological generation of such 
human responses has led to erroneous conclusions of the capaciy for 
empathy (King, 1958; Mayman, 1967; Urist, 1976). Urist (1976) addresses 
the presence of high sum Min certain psychotic inpatient populations. 
Exner (1983) includes the presence of an "M-" (a human movement response 
with the arbitrary or grossly d~storted assignment of form) as one of 
his five diagnostic categories for schizophrenia. K. Smith (1980) warns 
that: 
evaluators may be misled by the presence of human 
movement responses on the Rorschach test to infer a 
capacity for empathy. It is important to differenti_ate 
between a hyperalertness to feeling states and an 
accurate empathic concern for others .... While boundaries 
between self- and non-self representations are permeable 
(for the borderline), a temporary identification with 
another, while maintaining at the same time one's 
separateness, is quite difficult. (pp. 82-83) 
The production of "H" and "M" responses alone is insufficient for 
attributing empathy. "While an individual may be able to 'put himself 
in another's shoes', he may do so on the basis of a loss of self-other 
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differentiation, where he actually merges with the other" (Urist, 1976, 
p. 577). However, such responding taps~ of the necessary componants 
of empathy. Human movement or content is not an indication of empathy 
by itself, but the empathic process will certainly result in the 
production of such responses. Research into these type of responses has 
attempted to refine the attribution of empathy, and conversely, to 
understand the limitations of such responses by diagnostic groups who 
demon.strate limited empathic capacity. W. Smith (1980, p. 159) 
describes borderline human percepts as "tend(ing) to be less well 
articulated and differentiated", while adequate M responses tend to be 
two or less. K. Smith (1980) discusses the importance of examining the 
content of M responses when attributing empathy, and suggests borderline 
M responses are generally "spoiled", often by primitive drive wishes. 
Frieswyk & Colson (1980) found an increase in the predictive value of M 
for hospitalization outcome when the criterion was enhanced to include 
only human-like percepts with adequately articulated movement. 
A Projective Approach To The Study Of Object Relations 
Mayman (1968) was one of the first researchers to attempt the 
measurement of object relations, examining the mental representations 
through the analysis of his Early Memories Test. Krohn and 'Mayman 
(1974) applied rating scales to written reports of patients' dreams. 
Blatt et al. (1981) used a five minute projective description task 
requiring subjects to answer the question, "describe your 
mother/father." The answer was subsequently rated on fourteen 
qualitative characteristics, yielding a score along his (previously 
described) theoretical continuum of object relations. 
The measurement of object relations with the Rorschach can be 
characterized by two schools of thought, according to Spear (1980, pp. 
321-322). One may be viewed as the "developmental/structural 
perspective'', with Blatt and his associates at Yale pursuing this 
direction of research. "Drawing upon Werner's (1948) notion of the 
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individual's developmentally increasing capacity for articulation, 
differentiation, and integration of ·object concepts, (Blatt and his 
associates) developed a detailed structual scoring system for evaluating 
the more formal cognitive aspects of an individual's object relations" 
(Spear, 1980, p. 322). 
This elaborate scoring and structural analysis is not unlike other 
scoring systems, but it focuses solely on the level of object relations 
development of the subject. Briefly, the scale (Blatt, Brenneis, 
Brooks, Schimek, & Glick, 1976b) considers only human and quasihuman (H 
and (H) content) responses, further requiring either human activity (M 
determinant), or involving a substantial portion of the card, and 
containing explicit description of human (or quasihuman) qualities. On 
"rare'' occasions, animal content may be included if human or quasihuman 
qualities are attributed. 
These responses, once selected, are scored according to a number of 
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categories. These include form level; differentiation (H, (H), Hd, or 
(Hd) content); articulation of seven categories which examine for size 
or physical structure, clothing or hairstyle, posture, deliniation of 
unambiguous gender, age of figure(s), role or occupation, and specific 
identity (a proper noun); degree of articulation, which is simply the 
arithmetic mean of articulation categories per scored response; degree 
of intentionality of motivation, ranging from no reason offered for the 
action, to a description of the subject's choice of intention; 
object-action integration, scored as fused (action described with 
amorphous content), incongruent (object and action do not occur together 
in nature), nonspecific (not incongruent, but action could be produced 
by other objects as well), or congruent (the object is well-suited to 
perform the action); nature of interaction in responses with two or more 
human or quasi-human figures (scored as active-passive, active-reactive, 
or active-active); and content of interaction (malevolent or 
benevolent). 
Mayman and his asociates at The University of Michigan have 
followed a "thematic/affective" orientation. Unlike the Blatt work, the 
thrust of the Mayman school is directed at the thematic contents of the 
projective productions. They examined the interactional content, 
focusing on the approximations of healthy functioning by the human 
percepts. It ii the work of one of Mayman's students, Urist (1973), and 
the development of his Mutuality of Autonomy within Portrayed Relations 
in Rorschach .Imagery (MOA) scale (Appendix A) that was the source of 
exploration for the present research. 
The underlying hypothesis of the MOA scale maintains that portrayed 
relationships elicited by the Rorschach stimuli are representative of 
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the individual's experiences with, perception of, and capacity for human 
relationships. 
The (MOA)' scale focus(es) on the developmenatal 
progression towards separation-individuation, with 
particular emphasis given to the autonomy of others 
vis-a-vis the self, and conversely, the autonomy of the 
self vis-a-vis others. (Urist, 1977, p. 4) 
This seven point rating scale progresses from totally destructive 
relations, where the existence of one object precludes the healthy 
existence of another; to increasing awareness of the separateness, 
albeit unhealthy dependence within relationships; and finally towards a 
comprehension that the participants within the relationship have 
commonalities, positively interact, yet maintain properties to make them 
uniquely individual. The scale was applied to each Rorschach response 
defined by the following operational definition: "any response that 
contains a reference to a relationship, which may include animals, 
objects, vague forces, etc." (Urist, personal communication, 1982). 
To summarize, Urist's MOA scale examines "relationship" Rorschach 
responses on a continuum that would be completely appropriate and useful 
for examining the range of object relatedness in interpersonal 
behavior. In fact, part of the validation studies (replicated by the 
present re£earch) does just that (see Method). 
Both the developm~ntal/structural perspective of the Blatt school, 
and the thematic/affective perspective of the Mayman school have been 
demonstrated to be valid constructs for the assessment of object 
relations development and distinguishing between neurotic and 
schizophrenic patient groups that were diagnosed by traditional, time 
consuming clinical procedures that included psychological interviews and 
observed behavior, either in an inpatient milieu, or by outpatient 
therapists. 
Drawing on the structural theories of psychoanalysis, 
which sug·gest progressive autonomy from others and 
individuation of self as aspects of human development, 
research with these scales indicates the level of object 
relations is a valid and quantifiable dimension of 
personality that can be assessed on the Rorschach, and 
that the assessments correlate with independent clinical 
assessments. (Kwawer, 1980, p. 98) 
Moreover, Rorschach data on object relations has been used to predict 
treatment outcome (Mayman, 1967; Frieswyk & Colson, 1980). 
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These studies are not without their criticisms. Athey, Fleischer, 
& Coyne (1980, p. 277) in addressing the Blatt scale, poses the problem 
of "how one (may) differentiate the reflections of thought disorder 
organization and object relations so as to examine their interaction 
without confounding them?" The Blatt school (Blatt & Ritzler, 1974; 
Blatt & Wild, 1976) deals with this issue by the boundary-deficit 
hypothesis. Boundaries, whether between objects or thoughts, are 
conceptualized as having a common origin, and their deficits simply 
different manifestations. "Demonstrating parallels between thought 
disorder and object relations and/or assuming a superordinate common 
process (loss of boundary) does not clarify the nature of the parallel 
processes nor establish that they indeed are identical (Athey et al., 
1980, p. 277). 
Kwawer finds fault in the Urist study (and others), particularly in 
their application to borderline patients. 
Global assessments that assign a single numerical score 
to a Rorschach response or protocol imply a stability of 
level of object relations inconsistent with what may be 
in the nature of borderline psychopathology itself: that 
a characteristically wide range of levels of object 
relatedness is typically reflected in the interpersonal 
relations of borderline patients. (1980, p. 98) 
However, this criticism may not be valid. A global measure, whether 
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arithmetic mean or clinical rating, is certainly affected by the 
variability of the construct being considered. An analagous Rorschach 
index, that of form level, is presented as a simple percentage in 
clinical use. It is understood by practioners that all levels of 
psychological functioning, from schizophrenia to normal functioning, 
produce both "good" and "bad" responses (a protocol with a form level 
percentage of 100% is viewed as a particular form of rigid, stimulus 
bound pathology). And yet this percentage is among the most reliable 
and clinically useful test datum, validly distinguishing between 
nosological groups. 
Blatt has called for an integration of the two systems (Blatt et 
al. 1976b), but only one study has addressed this task. Spear (1980) 
examined both borderline and schizophrenic patients using both the Blatt 
scale and one by Krohn & Mayman (1974). However, the thrust of his 
research involved differential diagnosis for borderline subtypes, and 
his hypotheses were only partially upheld. His results did allow the 
"inference that (the two scales) tap relatively independent aspects of 
the capacity to represent objects" (p. 330) which he considered grew 
from "independent, though complimentary lines of development" (p. 334). 
Statement Of Purpose 
Psychoanalytic theory has remained dynamic and ever developing, not 
unlike the human psyche that is its subject matter. However, 
psychological testing capacities have not advanced at an equal rate, 
leaving diagnostic data unable to appreciate human qualities that have 
both theoretical and observational meaning (Blatt & Lerner, 1983). 
In addition to the traditional focus on ego structures, 
cognitive styles, and impulse-defense configurations, 
often couched in abstract metapsychological language, 
psychological test assessment must now include a fuller 
consideration of phenomenological, experiential, 
therapeutically relevant constructs such as self and 
object representation. These concepts ... can allow us to 
formulate clinically meaningful generalizations about 
patients' experiences in an interpersonal matrix. (p. 8) 
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The present dissertation attempted to continue some of the research 
measuring the level of object relations development. It also examined 
the resultant projective indices produced from the psychological 
ramifications of incomplete development. 
The present study is comprised of essentially two parts. The first 
consists of the replication of some of the work by Urist (1977) with 
adults and Urist and Shill (1982) with adolescents in the construct 
validation of the MOA scale. 
One crucial difference exists. The system used in both Rorschach 
administration and scoring will be that of Exner (1974-1982, vol. 
I-III). Not only is this an expansion of the work by Urist, it is the 
only study to do so in the measurement of object relations to date. The 
rationale behind this decision warrents discussion. 
The Question of System Choice 
Almost all of the psychoanalytic literature involving the 
measurement of object relations with the Rorschach (and the vast 
majority of all analytic Rorschach studies) use the administrative and 
interpretive system of Rapaport, Gill, & Schafer (1945). Of the five 
major systems prior to Exner (Beck, Hertz, Klopfer, Piotrowski, and 
Rapaport, Gill, & Schafer), it is the only one to drastically alter the 
administrative procedures of H. Rorschach's Psychodiagnostik (1942, 
originally published posthumously in 1921). Following the initial 
presentation of the card and the subject's undisturbed responses to it 
(the Free Association period), the card is removed from sight and 
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immediate questions regarding an elaboration of each response must be 
·answered from memory. This latter procedure, which Blatt claims to 
emphasize "the subject's representation rather than his or her 
perception of the response" (1983, p. 9) is deemed by Blatt as making 
this system the most desirable for object relations studies. The card 
is seen one time, and the responses are not returned to following the 
completion of the card. 
The decision for Exner. This bias by the analytic community seems 
only partially grounded in clinical choice. While argument can be made 
for the technique of inquiry by memory to minimize perceptual influence, 
there is good reason why the other four major systems, and Exner, chose 
to retain Rorschach's technique. By immediately following the responses 
to card I with a detailed inquiry, the subject is given feedback as to 
what is "wanted" on the remaining nine cards. This message becomes more 
precise with additional cards. Using the split presentation approach 
(presentation of the ten cards during Free Association, followed by a 
second presentation of the cards during the Inquiry), the subject is 
left to shape the ambiguity of the Rorschach stimuli by him/herself. 
This is particularly true in the orthodoxy of the Exner system, which 
leaves the subject virtually alone. It is not until the Free 
Association to all ten cards is completed that feedback as to what is 
desired by the examiner, in the form of questions regarding location, 
determinants, etc., is given (a single prompt for additional responses 
to an isolated response to card I being the sole exception). 
But an untainted Free Association is not the only motivation for 
using the Exner system. With the death of Bruno Klopfer and Samuel 
Beck, the Comprehensive System appears to have emerged as the system 
being taught with increasing popularity, and the vitality of the 
research behind it seems to support this effort. 
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Called the Comprehensive System, its original design was to take 
the best parts of the five major systems. But much to Exner's credit, 
he has compiled a program of research that has addressed many of the 
traditional challenges to the use of this potentially valuble tool. For 
example, interscorer reliability has survived as a serious opposition to 
the use of the Rorschach, and is often given as motivation to forego a 
structural analysis of the protocol. With the refinement of the 
Comprehensive System's scoring procedure, Exner (1978, p. 14) reports an 
interscorer reliability of .85 or greater. The nonpareil normative data 
is given not only for nonpatient adults, but for four psychiatric 
groups. Child norms are presented for each year from age five to 
sixteen, including a nonpatient and two psychiatric groups, effectively 
addressing the necessary modifications for interpreting the protocols of 
such developing psyches. 
As important as object relations is to modern analytic theory, it 
is not the only reason for administering the Rorschach. This study 
attempted to incorporate the power of the Comprehensive System with some 
of the work of object relations assessment. 
Response Selection 
Unlike all'other studies that assess object relations development 
with the Rorschach, Urist alone examines responses that are void of 
human or human-like content. Surprisingly, no mention is made of the 
significance of this decision in any of the object relations 
literature. To correct this flaw, this study examined MOA ratings both 
with and without the inclusion of such responses. 
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Object Relations Development and the Structural Summary 
The second part of the research involved comparing the MOA scale 
with the structural summary of the Rorschach. The middle ranges of 
object relations development (hence the middle ranges of pathology) was 
of prime concern for this project, as it has been in the literature. 
Thus, those structural indices which reflected the projection of the 
different componants of human interaction were expected to be 
specifically impaired with respect to the middle MOA scores. The 
fledgling status of the examined scale makes it presently impossible to 
quantifiably delineate the exact range of "middle'' scores, yielding 
results that will offer only population trend information. It is hoped 
that the present research may contribute to the future goal of 
establishing an interval scale for the understanding of borderline 
personality functioning. 
Hypotheses 
Preliminary hypotheses examined the relationship between well 
established indicators of overall, general pathology, and 
hypothetically, that of object relations development. 
Hypothesis one: Developmental Quality (DQ) was expected to be 
positively correlated with the MOA scale. The DQ, or level of cognitive 
development was derived from Friedman's (1952) Developmental Level 
scoring system of the Rorschach. It was originally based on a 
developmental sequence of Werner, where the individual matures from 
"syncretic, diffuse, labile, and rigid modes of functioning to discrete, 
articulated, stable, and flexible modes" (Blumetti & Greenberg, 1978). 
DQ ratings examine the inherent qualities of the response content, and 
not that which is articulated (although articulation my change the 
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content). For example, the response "water" is inherently formless, and 
would be scored "vague." A "tidal wave, smashing up against a boat, the 
peaks lashing at its sides" is articulated into a well defined construct 
and would receive a developmentally higher score. 
During the course of the investigation, the ongoing research by 
Exner resulted in a major scoring change in DQ (1983). Previously, a 
form level rating of"-" (form is arbitrary assigned or grossly 
distorted) meant the automatic assignment of a DQ rating of "-"·. This 
often yielded confusing results that made for ambiguous interpretation. 
The DQ rating of"-" has been dropped. In addition, a synthesis 
response (where "unitary or discrete portions of the blot are 
perceptually articulated and integrated or combined into a single 
percept'' (1974, p. 63) is now possible for objects that have no form 
requirements. This latter change acknowledges the potentially 
sophisticated response that has no inherent form (e.g. "this swirling 
cloud is partially covering up this rainbow, you can see some of the 
colors shining through in the sky''). Protocals were rescored according 
to the new criteria prior to analysis. 
Like so many structural summary indices, percentages are subject to 
cutoff levels for clinical significance. The new modifications have 
left the DQ scoring without such levels, so several critical values were 
examined. 
Hypothesis two: Extended form level (X+% - the perceptual accuracy 
of all responses, regardless of the determinant) was expected to be 
positively correlated with the MOA scale. A well researched indicator 
of pathology, form level becomes fixed and consistent starting at age 
five and persists throughout adulthood (Exner, 1974). This is a measure 
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of goodness of fit for the response, how well the subject sees responses 
that other people see in the inkblot stimulus (and therefore the result 
of the perceptual qualities of the blot). Using the Comprehensive 
System, a nonpatient adult sample yielded an X+% of M = .81 (SD= .12, 
1978, p. 4). Only schizophrenic samples show marked disturbances in 
such form level percentages (M = .57, SD= .14, p. 4), with 60% 
generally considered the critical X+%, and less than 70% considered 
suspect. 
Hypothesis three: Pure form. level (F+% - the perceptual accuracy 
of only those responses determined by form alone) will be positively 
correlated with the MOA scale. 
Pure form is viewed clinically as similar to Extended fo;m level, 
although it tends to be less sensitive. When a subject responds to a 
complex, shaded, and often multi-colored inkblot that has so much 
potential for projected kinesthesia, and articulates only the shape as 
the determinant of the response, he/she is thought to be taking a 
psychological step back, a break from the "bustling" mental processes 
involved in Rorschach responding. Again, it is only the schizophrenic 
group that distorts the "easier" to perceive pure form response (M = 
.62, SD= .08, compared to the nonpatient group of M = .89, SD= .08), 
but there is considerable more "misses" using this criterion. 
Essentially, it 'is psychologically a more simple task to accurately 
perceive less complex stimuli. 
Hypothesis four: Erlebnistypus4 (EB) values outside the range 
4Ambitent values are currently updated to +2 - -2 for sums of both 
sides of the EB ratio less than 7, +2.5 - -2.5 for sums between 7 and 
10, and +3 - -3 for sums greater than 10 (L. Martin, of Rorschach 
Workshops, personal communication, April 4, 1984). 
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labeled "ambitent" will be positively correlated with the MOA scale. 
This ratio was originally described by Hermann Rorschach (1923/1975) and 
compares the number of human movement responses (an ideational activity, 
since there are no humans moving on the blots) to a weighted sum of the 
color responses (a responsive activity where the subject reacts to the 
present stimuli). 
Considerable research has been done with this ratio. To summarize, 
two desirable adult response styles exist, and can be determined by the 
EB ratio (Exner, 1978). Called "introversive" and "extratensive" in the 
Comprehensive System, the styles remain consistent over time. For 
example, during problem solving tasks, both strategies employed and 
physiological responses to the stress significantly differed (1978, p. 
98). Here, the concept of "problem-solving" is extrapolated, and is 
interpreted as how one solves the problems of life. 
However, neither style is considered "better'', as both are 
comparable in achieving the necessary solutions to presented problems, 
despite their different approaches. What is undesirable is the person 
between the two previously mentioned types, called "ambitent" (p. 94). 
Such a person does not enjoy the flexibility of both of the previous 
personality styles, but rather, the disadvantages of both. Ambitent 
status is also consistent over time, and the inefficiency of such a 
response type mcikes it overreEresented in clinical populations. 
Hypothesis five: The presence of a Experience Actual/ experience 
potential (EA:ep,· Exner, 1978, p. 93) difference of greater than or 
equal to -2.5 was expected to be positively correlated with the MOA 
scale. The EA is the sum of the values of both sides of the EB, and 
refers to psychological activities performed by the subject, or 
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"psychological resources" that can be drawn upon. The ep is the sum of 
shading responses, and is associated with tension that "acts upon~ the 
subject, and may be considered a "psychological liability." 
Here again, new research by the Exner program resulted in further 
refinement of this structural summary index (1983) during the course of 
this study. Raw score differences between +2.5 - -2.5 places a person 
within the category of the majority of people with respect to having ''a 
relatively adequate tolerance to stress and the accessibility to 
resources to contribute significantly to the formation and direction of 
most behaviors" (p. 9). Higher "D" scores (critical values based on the 
index'es standard deviation) are indicative of higher stress tolerance, 
while lower scores suggest greater potential for impulsiveness, and 
"chaotic behavior" (with the type of regression determined by individual 
personality style) "because the person is on stimulus overl9ad" (p. 9). 
The index was further refined .by examining those specific 
contributors wHich reflect situational stress versus chronic, 
personality limitations leading to the experience of being "generally 
overwhelmed." The ep is composed of the sum of four Rorschach 
determinants, two being considered indicative of situational stress, and 
two influenced by the chronicity of personality underdevelopment. By 
removing the situation stress indicators (above the quantity given by 
most people, whether patient or nonpatient), an Adjusted D (p. 9-10) 
results that is representative of the latter, chronic clinical picture. 
The Adjusted D value was also expected to be positively correlated with 
the MOA value. 
Other general structural indices were compared with the MOA scale. 
The purpose of such examinations was to increase the clinical meaning of 
this new scale, and to suggest more specific directions for future 
research with the measurement of object relations. 
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Hypotheses addressing structural issues that are theoretically more 
specific to object relations follow. Each involve the creation of new 
structural indices, and were intended to provide impetus for future 
examinations of these componants of object relations development. 
Hypothesis six: A whole human/ parenthetic human percentage [H / 
(H + (H))] was expected to be positively correlated with the MOA scale. 
An H response requires the articulation of an entire and realistic human 
percept, while (H) addresses human-like monsters, mythical humans, and 
other, similarly "unreal'' replies. A zero denominator resulted in the 
index set to zero. This percentage was intended to tap the capacity to 
perceive humans in a realistic, undistorted fashion. A whole human/ 
extended parenthetic human percentage was also calculated. Here, the 
number of H responses was divided by all human, human-like, or 
human-part responses [H / (H, (H), Hd, or (Hd)]. 
Both of these percentages hypothetically tap a crucial property of 
object relations, namely that successful interpersonal functioning 
requires accurate perceptions of other humans, and must take into 
account their gestalt, and not merely part properties. 
Hypothesis seven: Pure H% (H, not (H), Hd, or (Hd) - the number of 
H responses/ total number of responses) was expected to be positively 
correlated with the MOA scale. This percentage theoretically reflected 
the capacity to perceive humans in an intact, whole manner. Pursuing a 
similar theoretical line of reasoning to the above hypotheses, this 
index addressed the amount of pure H responses with respect to the 
number of overall Rorschach responses. In a sense, it is an indication 
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of how much a person will get involved with the whole, accurately 
perceived complexities of another person. This percentage will be low 
for several maladaptive strategies. The person avoiding such 
involvement could withdraw from other hu.mans (low # of H responses), 
perceive them in a distorted fashion (produce (H) responses instead of 
H), distort the inherent complexities of humans by reducing them to 
parts (Hd), and even distort these parts [(Hd)]. The psychological 
state of affairs of such a response to humans is likely to be a 
combination of the above processes. It is important to realize that the 
production of any of these latter responses is not pathological itself. 
Psychological "time-outs" an~ focusing upon abstract or part-properties 
of other humans is essential for healthy functioning. It is when the 
production of such responses diminishes the production of pure H 
responses (seen interpretively as the processes of distorting or 
reducing whole, accurate human perceptions as limiting such healthy 
functioning) that may be viewed as pathological. 
Hypothesis eight and nine: Empathy and object relations theory. 
These hypotheses return to the previously addressed controversy in the 
Rorschach literature invo1ving the attribution for the capacity of 
empathy to the production of human movement (M) responses in the test 
protocal. Clinical populations clearly produce raw numbers of these 
responses, howe~er, they are often "spoiled" by pathological 
attributions. There are many ways that such a pathological modification 
may take place. Human movement may be attributed to a parenthetic human 
content (e.g. "these two wizards are mixing potions") or to non-human 
content (e.g. "this is a couple of rabbits kissing"). The subject may 
perceive human movement or human content with poor form quality. 
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Special scores, indicators of thought disorders, may be assigned to the 
response (e.g. "this gentleman here is about to dance the two-step with 
this lizard"). 
Thus, a good Mor H response, one theoretically indicative of 
healthy object relations will involve pure, whole human content, will 
have good form, and will not be as~igned any special scores. But even 
this may not be enough. What about the response that fits all of the 
above criteria, yet is clearly lacking in the mutuality necessary for 
healthy object relations? For example, assume the following response 
has been perceived in a fashion that resulted in a good form rating: 
"This man is angry. He is about to finally get his revenge, by shooting 
his arch-rival in the head." 
To be truly a good M response, a healthy object relations response, 
not only must all the previous requirements be passed, but some level of 
mutuality must be exceeded. Previously, such combinations of the 
different structural indices were left isolated, and their interactive 
meaning had to be deduced by the clinical wisdom of the interpreter. 
The present study attempted to not only formally combine these indices, 
but to supply what appears to be the missing quality of healthy thematic 
content by examinin~ MOA rating cutoffs for those responses involving 
relationships. 
Two new structural percentages were conducted by the present author 
for this study: 
GOODM 
# of M responses with good form level, pure H content, 
no special scores, and adequate MOA response scores 
# of M responses 
GOODH 
Where: 
# of H responses with good form level, no special 
scores, and adequate MOA response scores 
# of H responses 
-# H responses with good form level="+" or 11 0 11 
-pure human content= human content, and not Hd, (H), or (Hd) 
-no special scores= absence of special scores5 
-adequate MOA response scores= various levels of MOA 
ratings that were investigated. 
One other new Exner special score was included, that of Morbid 
Content (MOR). While not an indicator of cognitive slippage like the 
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critical special scores (it is used as a depressive indicator, although 
its frequency is high in psychotic populations), such a quality seems to 
certainly ruin the hypothetical "good" nature of the proposed new 
indices. 
The~e new indices were expected to correlate positively with the 
MOA scale. 
5Exner distinguishes between five critical special scores 
(indicative of thought disorder or cognitive slippage to a greater or 
lesser degree). These are (in order of increasing clinical severity, 
1978): 1) "DV" '(Deviant Verbalization), idiosyncratic, bizarre, or 
otherwise unusual modes of articulation; 2) "INCOM" (Incongruous 
Combination), where details of the blot are combined into an incongrous 
percept; 3) "FABCOM" (Fabulized Combination), involving a relationship 
between discrete blot details that have no chance of naturally 
occurring; 4) "ALOG" (Autistic Logic), where the subject spontaneously 
uses reasoning or justification that is indicative of loose or 
circumstantial associations; 5) "CONTAM" (Contaminated Response), 
involving the fusion of multiple percepts of the same blot area into a 
single percept that destroys any adequacy these previous percepts may 




Both adult clinical and normal .samples were used. The sample of 23 
males and 27 females, ages ranging from 20 to 49, was intended to cover 
a broad range of psychopathology, and hypothetically, of object 
relations development. 
The clinical sample consisted of 24 inpatients from a midwestern 
state hospital, and 16 outpatients from a university based clinic 
serving the school and surrounding communities. 10 non-clinical adults 
without a history of psychopathology and who had never received 
psychotherapy were a:lso used. They were currently enrolled in 
psychology courses and obtained extra-credit for their participation in 
the research. Since both neurotic and "normal" patients have 
theoretically completed object relations development, a reduced number 
of nonclinical subject"s were included in the sample. 
Instruments 
In addition to the previously described MOA scale and Comprehensive 
System, the autobiographical task which contributed to the scale's 
original validation and reliability assessment was administered (with 
minor modification). This was reported by Urist as being derived from 
the work of Henry Murray (1938, in Urist, 1977), to "elicit descriptions 
of the important people in the subject's life, his relationships with 
them and their rel~tionships with each other" (p. 5). He contrasts the 
ambiguous, projective requirements of the Rorschach with the 
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"undisguised" task of the autobiograpy. The Autobiography task and the 
scale used to evaluate its content for object relations are presented in 
Appendices Band C, respectively. 
The third measure used in the original study examined the patient's 
actual ward behavior. Ward staff were asked to rate their personal 
"relationships with the subjects, as well as rate their perceptions of 
the subject's interactions with others on the ward" (p. 5). The Staff 
Rating scale (Appendix D) is described as being parallel to the 
Autobiographical scale, but directly applicable to interactive behavior. 
"While staff ratings would certainly be based on inference, they were 
regarded as the most direct, least projective measure of those object 
relational phenomena that were hopefully to be tapped simultaneously via 
the Rorschach and Autobiography measures" (p. 6). 
Reliability 
Table 1 6 indicates the interscorer reliability in terms of percent 
agreement within pairs of raters in the original study. These figures 
were regarded as "highly respectable given the subjective nature of the 
ratings." 
TABLE 1 
Reliability in Terms of Percent Agreement(A) 
JRorschachJAutobiographylstaff 
Percent Within 1 Scale Point 
Percent Within! Scale Point 










(A)Reflects percent agreement between the two raters for each 
test. 
6 From "The Rorschach test and the assessment of object relations" by 
J. Urist, 1977, Journal of Personality Assessment, i_! (1), p.7. 
Copyright 1977 by The Society for Personality Assessment, Inc. 
Reprinted by permission. 
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Validity 
The i,mportance of measuring all extremes of pathology in the rated 
measures was not only emphasized to the raters in their arrival of an 
overall MOA score in the original study, but led to the inclusion of 
several other Rorschach scores. In addition to an overall score, each 
subject received 1) a score that reflected his highest (healthiest) 
single response, 2) his lowest single response, 3) a score representing 
the average of the best eight scored responses, 4) the average of the 
worst eight responses, and 5) the arithmetic average of all scored 
responses. Intertest correlations are shown in Table 2.7 
Urist. (p. 8) concludes: 
the data clearly support the hypothesis that 1) there is 
a consistency across all variables, a consistency that 
reflects an enduring aspect o:(' the patients' capacity for 
relationships across a range of measures; and that 2) the 
Rorschach is able to tap in a measurable way this aspect 
of the mutuality of autonomy within the patients' 
experience of self and other. 
While the overall Rorschach rating tended to correlate best with 
the Autobiography and Staff Rating tasks, a pattern of differential 
correlations seemed to have emerged. "Staff ratings tended to correlate 
relatively better with the healthier side of the Rorschach, while 
Autobiography ratings correlated relatively better with the more 
pathological Rorschach scores" (p. 8). With respect to all three 
measures of MOA,' the Rorschach yielded the most "pessimistic" or 
"pathological" appraisal of the patients. Average raw scores were: 
Rorschach, 3.20; Autobiography, 3.71; and Staff Ratings, 4.22. The 
7From "The Rorschach test and the assessment of object relations" by 
J. Urist, 1977, Journal of Personality Assessment, _Q (1), p.7. 
Copyright 1977 by The Society for Personality Assessment, Inc. 
Reprinted by permission. 
TABLE 2 
Intercorrelations(B) Between Mutuality 
of Autonomy Measures(C) 
Rorschach Autobiography Staff Ratings 
(overall) 
------------------- --------- ------------- -------------
Staff Ratings .53 .54 
Autobiography .67 
Rorschach 
average score .83 .63 .43 
high average .59 .63 .47 
low average .81 .57 .28 
highest score .09 .40 .25 
lowest score .63 .40 .09 
(B)All intertest correlations were significant beyond the 
. 001 level. 
(C)The use of the Spearman product moment correlation 
assumes equal interval data. Lingoes (197.9) describes 
a scaling method (CM-III) which employs a monotonic 
transformation of raw scores "such.that the average 
intercorrelation among them will be maximized subject 
to the restriction that rank order will be preserved . 
... Mild nonlinearities will either be obviated or 
minimized, giving rise to greater stability in one's 
results (e.g. upon replication) and making the 
product-moment correlation a better indicator of the 
relationships that exist but which are attenuated" 
(p. 279). "This results, in effect, in creating 
an equal interval scale. In· performing this 
transformation on the data the overall correlation 
average was improved by only .002 by the CM-III 
transformation, thus indicating that the original 
scales could be considered for all statistical 
purposes to have equal interval" (Urist, 1977, p. 7). 
Rorschach and Staff Ratings were significantly lower and higher, 
respectively, than the other measures ( £ <.01). 
Within subject consistency is an important issue here, as each 
subject presented a number of repsonses across the Rorschach MOA 
dimension. While the subjects' lowest Rorschach scores correlated 
better with other measures than did the higher (healthier) Rorschach 
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responses, ignoring these latter responses generated 1ower correlations 
than those measures which included the entire response range. Thus, the 
full range of MOA scores yielded the most precise picture of the 
person's true capabilities. 
In other words, when one speaks of a stable, enduring, 
structurally defined capacity for object relationships, 
this still must take into account a range or repetoire of 
behavior.across varying levels of functioning. With this 
range one can then point to areas of developmental 
arrest, regtession, etc., much the same ~ay one would 
describe the interplay of different levels of 
psychosexual development (p. 9). 
Procedure 
The subjects were informed that they were participating in a 
question and answer test standardization project. The·inpatient 
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population was informed that their participation would in no way affect 
their present treatment. Outpatient data were made available to the 
respective therapists, and this was understood by these subjects. In 
faci, these diagno~tic data were supplied at no cost to the outpatients, 
and served as the motivation for their participation. Subjects were 
additionally told that they could withdraw from the experiment at any 
time, that their participation was completely voluntary, and that they 
would receive no compensation (other than bonus points for the 
students). 
Each subject was given the Rorschach using the administration 
procedures described in The Rorschach: A Comprehensive System, Volume..!_ 
(Exner, 1974). The Autobiographical task was administered immediately 
afterward. The procedure varied somewhat from Urist's original study 
(1973), in which the patients were asked to write their responses to the 
Autobiographical task. Written performance requires a level of 
functioning which might have been beyond that of some of the subjects 
used in the present study, so they were only required to respond to the 
questions verbally after the task was read to them. However, level of 
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handwriting and neatness of prese·ntation were completely removed from 
the raters' knowledge by this modification. The order of test 
administration was not counterbalanced, as the Autobiographical task has 
clear, emotional references which might have influenced the relatively 
ambiguous, projective draw of the Rorschach stimulus. 
Task administration, rating of each of the tasks, and scoring of 
the Rorschach protocols were performed by separate personnel. The 
Rorschach's were administered by two advanced graduate students in 
clinical psychology who had completed their projectiv~ testing 
coursework and had been thoroughly examined by the present author in the 
administration of the Rorschach using The Comprehensive System. 
Although they were naive with respect to the experimental hypotheses and 
the details of the patients' current therapeutic status, the test site 
served to inform the administrators as to who were the inpatient 
subjects. A third clinical student administered the Autobiographical 
task. 
The Staff Rating scale was administered by a selected ward aide foi 
the inpatient subjects. This non-professional ward worker had regular, 
daily contact with the patient during hospitalization. Outpatient 
subjects were rated by their therapists with the same scale. Frequency 
of contact was generally one session per week. 
Rorschach responses were rated with respect to the MOA scale by two 
practicing clinical psychologists with extensive experience in 
projective testing. Instructions to the raters are listed with the 
scale in Appendix B. Only the responses were considered in the ratings, 
as information regarding location, response scores, and structural 
summaries were withheld. The Autobiographical task was rated by two 
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other practicing clinical psychologists. These psychologists were 
specifically chosen for their familiarity with the lifestyles indigenous 
to the Midwest. Subject values used for the measures were the means of 
the two raters for each measure. Responses in which the decision to 
rate could not be consolidated were dropped. The four raters, the ward 
staff, and the therapists who were involved with the staff rating task 
underwent an appropriate training period prior to the actual exposure to 
the subjects' protocols. Each Rorschach protocol was scored blindly by 
the present author according to the scoring system described in The 
Rorschach:~ Comprehensive System, Volumes .!_-III, system updates 
available from Rorschach Workshops published in The Alumni Newsletter 
(1981, 1983), and other recent modifications (L. Martin, of Rorschach 
Workshops, personal COI!\munication, April 4, 1984). The qualifications 
of the scorer included completion of all coursework in the clinical 




Table 3 indicates interscorer reliability in terms of percent 
agreement within pairs of raters for the present study. 
Table 3 




Percent Within 1 Scale Point .93 .90 .92 
Percent Within! Scale Point .85 .68 .86 
Percent Exact Hi ts • 56 . 34 . 40 
(D)Reflects percent agreement between the two raters for each 
test. 
The Urist study does not address separate interscorer percentages 
for both individual Rorschach responses and Overall Rorschach ratings. 
However, the resctlts in the present study indicate reliability between 
raters was at least as good as, and generally superior to, those 
originally reported. 
Validity 
Replicatincj the Urist (1973) study, overall MOA ("OVERMOA" - the 
MOA scale applied to the entire Rorschach protocol based upon the 
raters' clinical application of the scale) and the MOA mean responses 
within the protocol that were rated (RMOA) were compared to independent 
measures of subject functioning rated on an MOA-like scale. 
Autobiographical task ratings (AUTO) and OVERMOA Spearman 
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correlations of 0.25 were significant (_E = .031). OVERMOA and staff 
rating scales (STAFF), RMOA and AUTO, and RMOA and STAFF were not found 
significant. In fact, the one significant correlation appeared 
substantially below the original correlation value found by Urist (see 
Instruments). 
In considering these results and the Rorschach response 
modifications that result from the choice of Exner versus Rappaport, 
Gil, & Schafer, a situation became apparent which seemed similar to a 
dilemma faced by Exner and his associates. The Exner system allows the 
level of elaboration of responses to be predominately decided by the 
patient, and is thought to be indicative of the personality being 
examined. The schizophrenia index (SCZI) of the Comprehensive System 
(1982) proved to be a very powerful and reliable measure for the 
assessment of that respective disoder. However, it was, and remains, 
plagued by a specific category of schizophrenic patients which produce 
protocols that the SCZI misses (Exner, 1983; L. Martin, of Rorschach 
Workshops, personal communication, April 4, 1984). These patients tend 
to give a limited shallow protocol, producing few of the indices that 
are then examined according to the criteria of SCZI. "Thus, these 
schizophrenics respond to the Rorschach problem by distance, limited 
involvement, and superficial responses that are generally unelaborated 
and form determined. Such patients tend to be scored as false negatives 
on the SCZI, and Exner (1983; L. Martin, personal communication, April 
4, 1984) continues to seek adequate alternatives for modifications to 
SCZI that will reduce such inaccurat~ results in this limited 
population. 
In the present study, three of the "false negative" types emerged. 
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Three subjects gave protocols that had no responses with any 
interactional content. These superficial responses gave the judges 
limited data on which to base an OVERMOA ra.ting - no responses with MOA 
ratings and shallow responses in general. Left with such a decision to 
make, the judges independently used the hypothesis that an absence of 
pathological relationship responses yielded a nonpathological OVERMOA 
score. 
However, this working hypothesis did not appear consistent with the 
underlying hypotheses of the MOA scale. If relationship responses are 
indicative of capacities for relationships, then an absence of such 
responses would indicate a similar absence of such capacities. A 
decision to modify OVERMOA and RMOA scores for these three subjects to 
the most pathological rating seemed consistent with the scale's theory, 
and validity correlations were reexamined. The decision was further 
enhanced by the revelation that all three subjects were drawn from the 
inpatient sample and had psychotic diagnoses. 
The Spearman correlations of .37 for OVERMOA and AUTO was again 
found significant and substantially increased (£ = .0074). Other 
intertest correlations were increased, but failed to reach levels of 
significance (Table 4). Except where specified, all further 
calculations retained the modification rule that if there were no 
responses subject to rating by the MOA scale, the most path_ological 
rating was assigned for OVERMOA and RMOA. 
Considering the present dilemma of construct validation, that of 
assessing the validity of a tool with another unvalidated measure, the 
results of the above validation check for the MOA scale using the 
Comprehensive System were found acceptable. Correlations of OVERMOA 
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with the subject's highest rated response (HMOA, r = .55, E < .0001), 
and the subject's lowest rated response (LMOA, r .31, E .03), RMOA 
and HMOA (r = .76, .£ < .0001) and RMOA and LMOA (r .44, E = .002) were 
all significant and suggest the MOA scale as a valid indicator of object 
relations. Unlike Urist's original study, the number of ratable 
responses per subject (M = 5.02, SD= 3.00) made high average and low 
average scores inapplicable. 
Table 4 
Intercorrelations(E) Between Mutuality 
of Autonomy Measures{F) 
----------------------------------------------------------
Modi cation OVERMOA AUTO 
I 
STAFF 
Performed pre post pre post pre I post 
---------------- ------ ------ ------ --------------------
Staff .08 .19 .36 N/A 
* 
Auto .30 .37 
* ** 
Rorschach 
RMOA .74 .79 .16 .25 .07 .17 
**** **** 
Highest Score .55 N/A .19 .76 -.15 
**** **** 
Lowest Score .31 N/A .16 .44 .30 
* ** 
* l?<· 05 ** J?<.01 *** _£<.001 * * * * 2 <· 0001 
{E)Corre!ations with STAFF, N = 40. Rest of correlations: 
Premodification, N = 47, Postmodification, N = 50. 
(F)For consistency with object relations measures, STAFF 
ratings (which run from most pathological to least 
pathological, opposite of the other measures - see 
appendix C) has been inverted, thus allowing for 
(similar i.e. positive) correlation coefficients. 
Rating Nonhuman Relationships 
As previously discussed, Urist is alone in his decision to include 
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responses void of human content or movement in assessing object 
relations. To examine this, OVERMOA and RMOA were recalculated using 
only responses with M present (MONLY), only H content (HONLY), and only 
human or human-like content [HHONLY - content is scored either H, (H), 
Hd, or (Hd)]. This last recalculation, HHONLY, modifies the criterion 
for response inclusion in assessing object relations to one consistent 
with other measures of object relations assessment with the Rorschach. 
It is important to remember that the correction rule for protocols 
without ratable responses remained in effect. For example, a protocol 
that formerly had three ratable responses, with none of these three 
involving M, would receive the most pathological rating for both OVERMOA 
and RMOA when using the MONLY criterion for response inclusion. 
The validation measures of AUTO and STAFF were significantly 
correlated with OVERMOA and RMOA using MONLY and HONLY response 
selection criteria (see Table 5 for values). The HHONLY criterion 
yielded the single highest correlation for both OVERMOA (r = .46, .£ 
.0007) and RMOA (r =.36, .£ = .01); yet surprisingly, STAFF ratings were 
not significant. 
It appears, at least when using the Comprehensive system for 
Rorschach administration, that object relations assessment is best done 
considering only response~ that contain human content or activity. 
Comparison with the Structura.l Summary 
Few of the structural summary indicators of general pathology were 
significantly correlated with the (modified) OVERMOA or RMOA. 
Intercorrelations are presented in Table 6. 
Neither the general Developmental Quality percentage [(DQPER) - (DQ 
"+" + "o" + "v/+") /# DQ] nor cutoff levels at 70 (DQ70), 80 (DQ80), or 
Table 5 
Intercorrelations(G) Between Mutuality of 




AUTO STAFF AUTO STAFF 
---------- -------- -------- -------- ---------
Uri st .37 .19 .25 .17 
Criteria ** 
MONLY .43 .34 .28 .39 
** * * ** 
HONLY .38 .40 .25 .52 
** ** *"!<* 
HHONLY .46 .29 .36 .30 
*** ** 
* p<. 05 ** r><. 01 *** 1'<.001 
(G)Correlations with AUTO, N=50; Correlations 
with STAFF, N=40. 
90% (DQ90) yielded significant correlations with OVERMOA or RMOA. 
Likewise, Extended form level (X+%) or Pure form level (F+%) proved 
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nonsignificant when considering overall percentage or cutoff levels set 
at 70 (X+70 & F+70) or 80% (X+80 & F+80). Number of minus or weak 
responses was also nonsignificant. Ambitent classification of 
Erlebnistypus values (AMBI) proved nonsignificant as well. 
The Experience Actual : experience potential (EA:ep) difference, 
now represented by D scores was found significant when correlated with 
OVERMOA (r = -.373, _E = .0075) and RMOA (r = -.414, _E = .0028). 
Adjusted D scores also yielded significant correlations with OVERMOA (r 
= -.343, E = .015) and RMOA (r = -.365, E = .009). The capacity for 
stress tolerence, whether it is modified by situational circumstances, 
or purely a chronic, underdeveloped ego that regresses in response to 
Table 6 
Intercorrelations Between OVERMOA, RMOA And 
General Structural Summary Indices 
Variable OVERMOA RMOA Variable OVERMOA RMOA 
DQPER -.10 .05 AMBI .19 .10 
DQ 7 0 . 2 4 . 2 0 Z F - . 14 - . 0 9 
DQ80 .27 .11 ZD .29* .29* 
DQ90 -.01 -.18 MFREQ -.22 -.18 
DQSYN -.19 -.17 MQPER -.06 .01 
DQVSYN . 28* . 22 M- . 03 .11 
X+% -.21 -.04 M = 0 .17 .04 
X+70 .16 -.06 M- or 
M = 0 -.03 -.11 
X+80 .19 
R- .18 
























(H)Key to variables not previously explained in text or in 
Exner (1974, 1978, 1982) 
DQSYN - The number of DQ "+" responses 
DQVSYN - The number of DQ "v/+" responses 
MFREQ - The number of M responses 
MQPER - M quality percent [ (M+ & Mo) /total M] 
M- - The number of M- or M formless responses 
M = 0 -# of M = 0: l=yes, 2=no 
M- or M=O -The presence of either M=O or M-: l=yes, 2=no 







environmental tension appears related to level of object relations 
development. 
Indices Involving the Perception of Humanness 
Consistent with the literature revie_wed, mere number of human 
movement responses was nonsignificant with OVERMOA and RMOA. The 
presense of "M-" responses, absence of M responses,.or either condition 
similarly proved nonsignificant (Table 6). 
The production of human content' responses proved to be an important 
indicator of object relations development (Table 7). Using the strict 
criterion for whole human content scoring, the raw number of human 
content responses [HJ was found to be significant with OVERMOA (r = 
-.034, .£ = .015) and RMOA (r = -.299, .£ = .034). The percentage of pure 
H responses (H adjusted for total R) was found to be significantly 
correlated with OVERMOA (r = -.396, .£ = .004) and RMOA (r = -.326, .£ 
- . 02). 
Table 7 
Intercorrelations Between OVERMOA and RMOA 
with Human and Humanlike Content 
OVERMOA RMOA 
H -.34** -.30* 
H/R -.40** -.33* 
H/(H) -.17 -.19 
H/ -.23 -.16 
[H+ (H) +Hd+ (Hd)] 
* _p<. 05 ** 2<.0l N=50 
Two of the newly created percentages were found to be 
nonsignificant (Table 6). The whole human/ parenthetic human [H/(H)] 
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and whole human/all human content [H/(H + (H) + Hd + (Hd)] did not prove 
to be correlated significantly with either OVERMOA or RMOA. 
The GOODM and GOODH proved to be significant and potentially useful 
new structural indices. To reiterate their design, a GOODM response 
must have H content, and both GOODM and GOODH must have a form level 
rating of either"+" or 11 0 11 , no critical special scores, and pass an MOA 
critical level if the response was applicable to MOA rating. 
Special scores (with MOR scores= 0) were examined for criticalS 
O and also for critical4 = O, where the least pathological special 
score, that of DV (Deviant Verbalization) was permissible. MOA critical 
levels were set at increasing half point intervals until correlations 
became nonsignificant. Both the s~m of the responses surviving GOODM 
and GOODH criteria (GM and GH, respectively) and the GOODM and GOODH 
percentages (GOODM% and GOODH%) were compared with both OVERMOA and RMOA 
scores. Test results for GOODM and GOODH are presented in Tables 8 & 9 
and 10 & 11, respectively. 
GOODM data with criticalS special scores reveal significant 
correlations with GM following the most severe MOA critical level (MOA 
1.0) throughout the middle ranges of such scores for both OVERMOA and 
RMOA ratings. GOODM% scores did not enjoy such significance. While the 
inclusion of M responses with DV special scores (i.e. critical4) reduced 
correlations slightly, it did, however, push them into the 
nonsignificant range. 
GOODH data followed similar trends. Beyond the most stringent MOA 
critical level (MOA = 1.0), GH was found significant for both criticalS 
and critical4 special score levels when correlated with OVERMOA. GOODH% 




GOODM Intercorrelations for Critical5 = O 
-------------------------------------------------------
MOA Cutoff OVERMOA RMOA 
Level GM GOODM% GM GOODM% 
-------------- ------------------- --·------- ----------
1.0 -.24 -.09 -.23 -.10 
1. 5 -.31* -.15 -.33* -.18 
2.0 -.30* -.15 -.30* -.15 
2.5 -.30* -.15 -.30* -.15 
3.0 -.30* -.15 -.30* -.15 
3.5 -.30* -.15 -.30* -.15 
4.0 -.30* -.15 -.30* -.15 
4.5 -.30* -.15 -.30* -.15 
5.0 -.27 -.12 -.27 -.12 
5.5 -.27 -.12 -.27 -.12 
* p<. 05 N=50 
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Table 9 
GOODM Intercorrelations for CriticaJ.4 = O 
MOA Cutoff OVERMOA RMOA 
Level GM GOODM% GM GOODM% 
-------------- --------------------- ---------- -----------
1.0 -.24 -.07 -.22 -.07 
1.5 -.32* -.31* -.15 -.31* 
2.0 -.27 -.11 -.25 -.11 
2.5 -.27 -.11 -.25 -.11 
3.0 -.27 -.11 -.25 -.11 
3.5 -.27 -.11 -.25 -.11 
4.0 -.25 -.10 -.26 -.12 
4.5 -.27 -.11 -.25 -.11 
5.0 -.24 -.23 -.23 -.08 
5.5 -.24 -.08 -.23 -.08 
* g<. 05 N=50 
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Table 10 
GOODH Intercorrelations for Critical5 = 0 
MOA Cutoff OVERMOA RMOA 
Level GH GOO DH% GH GOODH% 
-------------- --------------------- ---------- -----------
1.0 -.30* -.26 -.21 - .13 
1.5 -.37** -.34* -.34* -.32* 
2.0 -.35** -.29* -.29* -.18 
2.5 -.35** -.29* -.29* -.18 
3.0 -.35** -.29* -.29* -.18 
3.5 -.35** -.29* -.29* -.18 
4.0 -.35** -.29* -.29* -.18 
4.5 -.35** -.29* -.29* -.18 
5.0 -.32* -.22 -.26 -.12 
5.5 -.32* -.22 -.26 -.12 
6.0 -.32* -.22 -.26 -.12 
6.5 -.32* -.22 -.26 -.12 




Visual inspection of the tables reveals almost no impact being made 
by the MOA cutoff levels. In clinical terms, one may deduce that once 
the response has passed the distinguishing factors of pure H present 
(for GOODM), adequate form level, and no special scores, it is in fact a 
GOODM or H response that appears to have significant relationship with 
level of object relations development. The previously hypothesized 
response, one that meets all of the requirements for content, form 
level, and absence of special scores, but lacks mutuality of autonomy, 
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Table 11 
GOODH Intercorrelations for Critical4 = 0 
MOA Cutoff OVERMOA RMOA 
Level GH GOODH% GH GOODH% 
-------------- --------------------- ---------- -----------
1.0 -.24 -.15 -.15 -.06 
1.5 -.33* -.26 -.27* -.18 
2.0 -.27* -.15 -.22 -.06 
2.5 -.27* -.15 -.22 -.06 
3.0 -.27* -.15 -.22 -.06 
3.5 -.27* -.15 -.22 -.06 
4.0 -.27* -.15 -.22 -.06 
4.5 -.27* -.15 - 22 -.06 
5.0 -.25 -.09 -.20 -.01 
5.5 -.25 "'". 09 -.20 -.01 
6.0 -.25 -.09 -.20 -.01 
6.5 -.25 -.09 -.20 -.01 
7.0 -.25 -.09 -.20 -.01 
(no cutoff) 
* 2<-05 N=50 
just doesn't seem to appear with any discernabJ.e frequency. 
CHAPTER IV 
Discussion 
The present study has attempted to continue the research in the 
measurement of object relations using the MOA scale of Urist (1973, 
1977). Object relations assessment is still in its infancy, faced with 
construct validation when such constructs remain only inferentially 
meaningful, at best. Nor does a ready population with clearly 
demarcated levels of object relations present itself. The borderline 
patient, currently "center-stage" in psychoanalytic theoretical concern, 
remains far from being reliably diagnosable as a clinical research 
population. 
Reliability and Validity 
The initial thrust of the present study was an extension of the 
reliability and validation work by Urist (1973, 1977) and Urist & Shill, 
(1982) to Rorschach administration and scoring using the Exner 
Comprehensive system. This was discussed as desirable as a result of 
the extensive benefits and ongoing research of the Exner system. 
Using interscorer reliability, the present data reached or 
surpassed that of the Urist study on almost every level. Despite its 
extremely abstract appearance, the scale seems manageably reliable for 
clinical use. 
Crucial to any discussion of validity is the understanding that the 
non-projective measures used in the original study are not more 
"accurate" assessors of object relations development. On the contrary, 
there are clearly many factors besides object relations that affect 
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interpersonal functioning, and innumerable, non-personality factors that 
might affect subjective appraisals of interpersonal functioning. Thus, 
the dilemma facing the creation and validation of a tool to measure 
object relations development may be thought of as similar to that facing 
Alfred Binet (1916) in the first comprehensive attempt at the 
measurement of intelligence. A theoretical construct was used to create 
a tool, and the criteria for validity comparison (i.e. level of adaptive 
functioning, school achievement) were important correlates, but 
significantly different from the original construct. Ultimately, the 
development of such a tool has led to an intrinsic meaning of its 
results, the IQ (it is acknowledged that Binet's contribution was that 
of the construct "Mental Age"). This is exemplified by Arthur Jensen's 
(1969, p. 8) restatement of Edwin Boring's comment, "intelligence, by 
definition, is what intelligence tests measure." Certainly all recent 
developments in the measurement of intelligence must prove a 
significantly high correlation with the criterion of an age-appropriate 
Wechsler scale. Thus, while the constructs used for validation supply 
impetus for clinical use of the scale, it will be this latter work that 
provides the most important information regarding its potential 
advantages. 
The present data yielded results similar to Urist's in finding the 
MOA scale as a viable measure of object relations. The validity 
measures were enhanced by a modification rule, whereby subjects offering 
no responses containing relationships were reassigned overall MOA scores 
of seven, the most pathological rating. The thrust behind such a rule 
follows the logic that if relationship responses reflect the capacity 
for relationships, then a protocol without relationship responses is 
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likely to reflect severe impairment in this capacity. Clinically, the 
diagnostician presented with a relationshipless protocol might begin to 
form hypotheses regarding such impairment, which may be further explored 
by other test data which "forces'' the patient to deal with relationships 
(the TAT, for example), clinical interview, or case history. 
It is important to recognize that the _correlations involving the 
protocol's response with the highest rating, as well as the lowest 
rating, are theoretically indices of validity, and not reliability. 
Object relations development yields a range of overt behavior, from the 
person's best compensated interaction to a level of regression below 
that which might be thought of as "typical." Theoretically, the person 
with a lower level of object relations development will regress lower, 
and produce a lower level of "optimal" functioning than his/her 
counterpart with a higher level of object relations development. 
Urist's decision to include all interactive content responses for 
rating with the MOA scale, unlike other attempts at object relations 
measurement (Blatt et al., 1976a & b; Blatt & Lerner, 1983; Krohn & 
Mayman, 1974; Spear and Lapidus, 1981) which limit their ratings to 
human or human-like content was not supported. Reexamining the data 
with such criteria suggested that the MOA scale would be enhanced by 
limiting responses to include only those which present human or 
human-like content, or if absent, human movement determinants, simila_r 
to the criteria for inclusion presented in Blatt et al. (1976b). 
However, this conclusion should be interpreted cautiously, as the 
overall MOA scores that remained intact after the transformation (i.e. 
were not subject to the modification rule of OVERMOA = 7 if number of 
ratable responses= 0) were based upon the ratings of all responses. 
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The most prudent suggestion for such results is that of calling for 
experimental replication using the Blatt et al. inclusion criteria with 
the MOA scale. 
Some Post-Hoc Thoughts Regarding the MOA Scale 
Urist (1977) states that his raters reported the scale as "concrete 
and specific enough" (p. 9) so that factors other than object relations 
were not taken into account. He proposed replication of the study using 
excerpted responses, so that raters would get exposure to just those 
responses needing rating, and not entire protocols, to examine the 
possibility of unconscious inclusion of such extraneous variables. 
Urist and Shill (1981) performed this replication with adolescents, and 
concluded that indeed, factors other than object relations were 
eliminated. 
Such a conclusion is questionable. The process of excerpting may 
remove such factors as form level, sum or presence of special scores 
(thought disorder), developmental quality, or primitiveness of content 
for the protocol in general, but they will remain present in each of the 
excerpted responses undergoing the rating process. In fact, the 
strategy may have backfired. Protocals generally exhibit a tendency 
toward cohesion, and a relative improvement along the criteria discussed 
during more simple, less involved responses. The failure to "rebound" 
with more simple stimuli (i.e. X+% versus F+%) or the inability to take 
the psychological step back to produce the more simple response (i.e. 
Lambda too low, Exner, 1978) is considered clinically significant. By 
removing the simple, less involved "noninteractional" responses from 
each protocol, the rater may be left with responses that tap the lower 
level of functioning indicators that Urist attempted to avoid in the 
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first place. 
This is not an attack on the validity of the Urist scale, but an 
acknowledgement that such factors cannot be removed from as 
multi-dimensional a construct as object relations. Nor is such a 
separation necessarily desirable for clinical use. The Rorschach 
response that scores in the healthiest range of MOA rating, but also 
receives a pathological special score would not be interpreted as being 
representative of well developed object relations. 
With respect to.the clinical application of the scale, the raters 
of the present study, as well as the present author, found little 
"concrete" about the scale. The ambiguities regularly fell into three 
categories. First, rating "4" appeared too restrictive. It is 
described as "one figure is seen a~ the reflection or imprint of 
another," with "shadows and footprints" given as an example. The raters 
were at a loss to find responses for this category that were not 
reflections, shadows, or footprints. They also felt compelled to assign 
all reflection responses to this category, often over other, more 
important concerns of relatedness within the response. 
Secondly, responses with multiple levels of relatedness need to be 
addressed. This may be resolved with as simple a modification as the 
operational definition of scoring the responses' highest (or lowest) 
level of mutuality, but this must be unambiguously dealt with. 
The third criticism is the most severe - the scale often fails to 
address levels of drive sublimation. For example, rating seven (the most 
pathological) discusses criteria of being "swallowed up, devoured." 
Does this mean a response of "a monster, biting the head off its victim" 
. should receive an identical rating as that of "a boy eating an ice cream 
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cone?" Hardly. But this was a quality frequently complained about by 
the raters instructed to "stick to the criteria of the scale." Figure 
integrity, one of the crucial factors of the scale, must be linked to 
drive sublimation. The oral destructiveness described in the example 
responses represent different levels of functioning, and would be 
clinically interpreted differentially. Sublimation must be incorporated 
into the scale so that, for example, figures whose integrity is "meant 
to be lost" can be appropriately rated. It does appear that limiting 
the rated responses to the previously recommended Blatt criteria would 
also eliminate this problem. 
Clinical Use of the Exner System 
It must be recognized that the administrative procedures for Exner 
were somewhat more restrictive in the present research than in actual 
clinical use. Formal scoring of the responses (and the data which 
contributes to the structural summary) is strictly limited to the 
articulations of the Free Association and the Inquiry proper. The 
emphasis of.the Exner system is clearly directed at a structural 
interpretation, but in clin~cal practice, the diagnostician is free to 
return to the responses during the Testing of Limits. Questions 
regarding thematic content and outcome are appropriate during this time, 
as long as they do not influence the scoring of the response. This 
latter line of questioning, the Testing of Limits, was not performed in 
the present research. Thus, the data were void of potential thematic 
enhancement which would be available during clinical use. A 
conservative hypothesis would be that such response content expansion 
would increase the power of the MOA scale. Using this approach, the 
power of the Exner structual summary would be available with clear, 
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unambiguous thematic content for object relations assessment. 
Structural Indices and Object Relations 
As a construct, the various levels of object relations development 
will differentially affect psychopathology. The primitively developed 
object relations of the schizophrenic will be involved in the ubiquitous 
ineffectual functioning of that disorder. The borderline's object 
relations will allow for considerable adaptive functioning outside the 
realm of interpersonal functioning, but begins to deteriorate when 
dealing with issues of autonomy, closeness, abandonment, and other, 
diagnostically significant themes. Neurotic pathology stems from 
developmental issues beyond that of object relations, which is intact 
and complete with whole, self and object representations. 
When the object relations development of these nosological groups 
can be psychometrically differentiated, then the structural summary 
indices diagnostically indicative for these groups should prove 
meaningful for their object relations measurment as well. 
For example, form level below 60% is an indication of 
schizophrenia. When a rating value·of object relations is available for 
this diagnostic category, then it should prove indicative of form level 
below 60% as well. However, the entire continuum of object1 relations 
development will have a significantly deflated correlation with such a 
form level cutoff, because object relations development beyond that of 
schizophrenia will surpass this level of form quality. 
This situation exemplifies much of the difficulty in considering 
correlational data with structural summary indices for general 
pathology. The indices have clinical meaning for diagnostic groups, but 
are not continuums of levels of development in general. 
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A notable exception to this is the D score, and its modification, 
the adjusted D score. Having the psychological resources available to 
handle the stresses one is presented with indeed sounds like a corollary 
of object relations development. These indices were the only ones of 
those listed under general psychopathology which had a meaningful 
continuum along all levels of psychopathology (and object relations), 
and was not subject to the problem of nosological differentiation 
previously discussed. 
Indices of Hummaness 
Those indices that specifically address theoretical components of 
object relations proved meaningful when correlated with the MOA scale. 
H responses, those responses which see whole, real humans, was a 
significant indicator both in raw frequency and when adjusted for 
overall responses. 
The new indices of GOODM and GOODH offer considerable potential for 
future clinical use. It seems clear that the presence of DV should 
remain part of the exclusion criteria. The superior correlations of 
GOODM and GOODH response totals (GM and GH, respectively) over their 
percentages (GM/Mand GH/H) indicates that the production of "spoiled" M 
and H responses (according to the GOODM and GOODH criteria) is expected 
and, by itself, not pathological. It is the survival of some of these 
responses when put to the GOODM and GOODH acid tests that appears 
correlated with object relations development. 
To reiterate one of the results, the GOODM and GOODH wer.e 
negligibly modified by the criterion of MOA cutoff level. The 
interpretation of this is important for clinical understanding. As a 
construct, clinical use of the GOODM and GOODH does not suggest total 
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disregard for the level of mutuality in the thematic portion of the 
response. Quite the contrary, the theory behind their formation 
addresses a "spoilage" of Mand H responses with impaired object 
relations. The lack of significance that the MOA rating played in 
discerning the process of spoiling addresses the sensitivity by which 
the other structural indices of the Exner system (although previously 
not combined) detect such a pathological process. The previously 
hypothesized response, one that has pure H, good form level, no special 
scores, but impaired Mutuality of Autonomy rarely exists. 
In its hypothetical clinical use, however, such a response might 
occasionally present itself to the diagnostician. Clinical intuition 
would still advise scoring this response as ~poiled, in violation of the 
criteria for inclusion in either the GOODM or GOODH. 
Recognizing that even nonpatients produce few "M" (M = 3.48, SD= 
1.8) and "H" (H + Hd, M = 4.77, SD= 1.4; Exner, 1978, pp. 4-5), cutoff 
levels for GOODM and GOODH will be very low. It may be that the 
production of any GOODM or GOODH has significant meaning in terms of 
level of object relations development. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The present research, adding to that of Urist (1973, 1977) and 
Urist & Shill (1982) suggests considerable clinical potential for the 
Mutuality of Auionomy scale. The next step is to provide test values 
for clinical differential diagnosis. 
Future research therefore requires the acquisition of a borderline 
sample, in addition to one with schizophrenic, neurotic, and "normal" 
subjects. Application of the MOA scale to these samples could then 
easily be analyzed for power of differentiation. The new indices of 
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GOODM and GOOCH call for similar examination. 
It is hoped that the measurement of object relations will progress 
to a level where differential diagnosis is possible, and that individual 
patient scores will have clinical meaning. The MOA scale offers 
potential to fulfill this goal, and it is hoped that the conclusions and 
recommendations of the present research make a meaningful contribution 
to this pursuit. 
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APPENDIX A 
MUTUALITY OF AUTONOMY WITHIN PORTRAYED 




MUTUALITY OF AUTONOMY SCALE 
Mutuality of Autonomy refers to the degree to which people in 
relationships are conceived, by the subject, as psychologically 
autonomous; as possessing an enduring, inherent psychic existence. The 
subject experiences others as possessing a self, while at the same time 
objectively recognizes his or her own existence as one object among 
many. Both self and others are simultaneously experienced by the 
subject as possessing an identity, a will, and the subjective, affective 
experience of selfhood. The subject conceives of relationships as 
respecting these attributes independently of fluctuations in the need 




MUTUALITY OF AUTONOMY WITHIN PORTRAYED 
RELATIONSHIPS IN RORSCHACH 
IMAGERY 
The following is an attempt to construct a series of ordinal 
gradations in the degree to which relationships in Rorschach imagery are 
characterized by a recognition and preservation of the integrity of the 
respective figures. These seven categories are by no means exhaustive; 
rather, they attempt to define a sense of ordinally related steps or 
degrees, capturing the extent to which figures are portrayed as 
maintaining or losing their own integrity within object relations. 
Please rate each response that seems appropriate to this dimension; 
that is, rate each response that refers explicitly or implicitly to two 
or more figuresl in relationship to each other. On the attached sheet, 
write the number of the card, the number of the response, and your score 
from one through seven. After going through the patient's entire 
Rorschach, make an overall (1-7) rating that you feel best represents 
the Rorschach protocol as a whole for this dimension. 
1) Figures are engaged in some relationship or activity where they ~re 
together and involved with each other in such a way that acknowledges 
their individual integrity. The image contains explicit or implicit 
reference to the fact that the figures are separate, and involved with 
each other in a way that recognizes or expresses a sense of mutuality in 
lThe word "figures" here is to be understood in its broadest sense; 
figures can be humans, animals, plants, vague forces, inanimate objects, 
etc. 
the relationship. (For example, on card II, "Two bears toasting each 
other, clinking glasses.") 
2) Figures are engaged in some activity or relationship which has no 
particular bearing on the question of their integrity (Card III: Two 
women doing their laundry). 
3) Figures are seen as leaning on each other, or one figure is seen as 
leaning or hanging on another. The sense here is that objects do not 
"stand on their own feet," or that in some way they require some 
external source of support or direction. 
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4) One figure is seen as the reflection, or imprint of another. T~e 
relationship between objects here conveys a sense that the definition or 
integrity of an object exists only in so far as it is an extension or 
reflection of another. Shadows, footprints, etc. would be included 
here. 
5) The nature of the relationship between figures is characterized by a 
theme of malevolent control of one figure by another. Themes of 
influencing, conttolling, casting spells are present. One figure may 
literally or figuratively be in the clutches of another. Such themes 
portray a severe imbalance in the mutuality of relations between 
figures. On the- one hand, figures may be seen as powerless and 
helpless, while at the same time, others are omnipotent and 
controlling. 
6) Not only is there a severe imbalance in the mutuality of relations 
between figures, but here, the imbalance is cast in decidedly 
destructive terms. Two figures simply fighting is not "destructive" in 
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terms of the integrity of the figures, whereas a figure being tortured 
by another, or an object being strangled by another are considered to 
reflect a serious attack on the integrity of the object. Similarly, 
included here are relationships that are portrayed as parasitic, where a 
gain by one figure results by definition in dimuniton or destruction of 
the integrity of another. 
7) Relationships here are characterized by an overpowering, enveloping 
force. Figures are seen as swallowing up, devoured, or generally 





Directions: Now I would like to get some about your past. I will ask 
you questions concerning your family history, personal history, social 
history, major experiences, aims and aspirations, and your estimate of 
your self and world. Please con$ider these questions a general 
guideline, and be sure to include any information which you believe to 
be relevant. Of course, your answers will be completely confidential 
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and used only for this research project. I will ask each section first, 
then answer as you see appropriate. Do not feel~ need to answer all of 
the questions, or to produce a lengthy account of your past. Just 
mention a few brief comments with respect to the most important features 
of your growing up. (Only the numbered sections are to be read to the 
subject. Each numbered section should be read in its entirety prior to 
the subject responding. If necessary (due to the level of the patient's 
functioning), assist the subject by rereading parts of the numbered 
portions). 
Family History (be sure that all responses refer to the family of origin 
and the respective time period). 
1) Describe your parents. What are they like? What kind of people are 
they? 
2) What was your general home atmosphere like? What was the nature of 
your attachment to your family? Who was your favorite parent? What 
fantasies did you have about you parents; what kind of disappointments 
and resentments did you have? Which parent do you most resemble? What 
was the attitude of each of you parents toward you? What kind of 
special enjoyments did you have at home? Were there any special 
difficulties or unhappiness? 
3) What are your sisters and brothers like? Tell me about your 
grandparents and other relatives. 
Personal History (be sure it is history) 
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1) What was your early development (or growing up) like? Include your 
play activities, toys and animals, other children, fantasies about your 
self, favorite stories and heroes, and generally describe what you were 
like as a child. 
2) Describe your school age behavior. Include your scholastic record, 
best and worst subjec~s, and age when finished. 
3) Discuss your friendships. Who were your firends? What did you look 
for in a friend? What did your friends value in you~ 
4) What were your associations (or dealings) with groups? How were you 
regarded and why? Describe your ambitions and ideals. What kind of 
hero worship did you have; were there any people, historical or present, 
who you attempted to imitate? What qualities did you particularly 
admire? What interests and amusements did you have? 
Social History 
1) At what age did you begin dating? What would you look for in a 
boyfriend/girlfriend? Have you ever been in love? How often? What 
type of person was selected? What are your fantasies of an ideal mate? 
What is your attitude toward marriage? 
Major Experiences 
l) What are your positive major experiences? 
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2) What are your negative major experiences? 
Aims and Aspirations 
1) What are your chief aims for the immediate future? 
2) If you could remodel the world to your heart's desire, how would you 
have it, and what role would you like to play in such a world? 
Estimate of Self and World 
1) What is your general estimate of and attitude toward the social 
world? 
2) What is the world's estimate of and attitude toward you? 
3) What is your general estimate of yourself? 




RATING SCALE FOR THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL TASK 
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TO WHAT EXTENT ARE RELATIONS BETWEEN PEOPLE 
CHARACTERIZED BY MUTUALITY 
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1) Here, relationships are characterized by a clear sense of the 
integrity of each of the partners, where the overall tone is one of 
mutual respect, rather than neurotic compromise. Relationships can be 
deep, meaningful and satisfying, with no risk to the integrity of the 
participants. Such interactions are portrayed as mutually enhancing 
rather than draining or depleting. Within the relationship, the 
integrity of one's partner is not only tolerated, but is appreciated and 
valued. 
2) Relationships here clearly reflect a sense of individuals mutually 
interacting. The mutuality, however, is essentially portrayed in terms 
of interlocking neuroses. People clearly separate however the mutual 
"give and take" between them is in the service of neurotic needs, so that 
people are seen as feeding into one another's pathology. While the 
subject seems clearly to have the capacity for mutuality in 
relationships, ~is portrayal of mutuality is somehow perjorative or 
disparaging. 
3) Here, there is a tentative, fleeting tendency in relationships toward 
a recognition of each other as individuals, each in his/her own right. 
In theoretical terms, the category corresponds to the border between 
narcissistic and object cathexis. Relationships here tend to vacillate 
between satisfaction-oriented, or mirror-types of interactions on the one 
hand, and relationships where individuals are experienced as mutually 
effecting each other without severe risk to the integrity as separate 
individuals 
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4) People are portrayed as getting along with each other only in so far 
as they are alike. The importance of "likeness" here goes well beyond an 
apppreciation for shared interests and tastes: the tone here is more one 
of people needing to act as narcissistic reflections of each other. 
Rather than seeing relationships as centering around shared internalized 
interests and values, here people are seen as acting "as if" they shared 
things in common, in order to engage each other. The underlying 
narcissictic assumption is that people must be alike, or must "mirror" 
each other, in order to maintain any level of interest or concern one for 
other. 
5) Relationships reflect an underlying "functional" orientation. People 
interact and relate to each other only insofar as a function is performed 
by one individual for the other. People are essentially experienced in 
terms of the functions they perform, and every interaction is 
predominantly seen in terms of its potential for frustration or 
satisfaction. All interaction are by definition functional, where one 
person "performs" and the other person "receives." The emphasis here is 
clearly on the function rather than on the person. 
6) While lacking the extreme malevolent and overpowering quality of the 
following category, relationships here are characterized by an overriding 
absense of any r~al sense of people as active agents in their relations 
with each other. The predominant theme is one of coercion or 
manipulation. The emotional tone of these interactions is an aggressive 
one. 
way: 
Interactions are portrayed as destructive in almost a paraiitic 
in order for one person to gain another must lose. 
7) The overall impression is conveyed by the subject's description of 
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relations between people is one of malevolent, overpowering envelopment. 
The· idea of some malevolent power taking control of a completely 
helpless, passive victim can be reflected in any number of metaphors and 
themes. The tone is generally oral aggressive and often has the quality 
of "gobbling up," "sweeping up," "swooping down," etc. Where these 
themes are not explicitly mentioned, the "overwhelming" quality is 
implicit in his/her descriptions of human interactions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(Assign one rating to each subject) 
APPENDIX D 
STAFF EVALUATION OF WARD BEHAVIOR 
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STAFF EVALUATION OF WARD BEHAVIOR 
Patient: Ward: 
To What Extent Does The Patient Experience 
Relationships As A Mutual Experience? 
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1) The patient exhibits extreme confusion over who they are; they may 
believe they are someone else, or that someone is controlling their 
actions and thoughts. When in close contact with others on the ward, 
they may actually describe feeling as if they were someone else, or this 
may be inferred from their behavior. 
2) While not experiencing as total a loss of self-boundaries as is 
manifest in the above situation, the patient experiences others as 
impinging on his/her integrity in a concrete way. While they still know 
who they are, they may feel, for example, that others can read their 
mind. 
3) While the boundary loss is not as primitive as above; the patient 
seems to experience the world as an extension of his/her own feelings: 
if they feel X, then they expect everyone else to feel X. If they wish 
Y to be true, then regardless of reality input, for them it is true. 
4) While not distorting reality as seriously as in the above cases, the 
patient easily loses a sense of their own integrity when confronted with 
a situation in which they are challenged in some way. This may be 
reflected in defensive style of oppositionalism, where in order to 
maintain their own integrity they must contiually be ''right," or in a 
style where they agree with whomever they are with, and tailor 
1 
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· themselves to meet the expectations of others. 
5) The patient's impressions of others are highly colored by their mood 
at the time. While not seriously distorting reality, they are 
relatively unable to step back and take distance from their highly 
subjective definiition of the situation, even when presented with 
conflicting "evidence." The world around them is often experienced as 
an extension of the nuances of their own feeling state. 
6) The patient has the ability to experience themself as separate and 
unique, hovever, for whatever neurotic reasons, this may be fraught with 
anxiety. They may deny or inhibit their uniqueness, or may use it 
defensively. This may be experienced depressively, in the sense "there 
is nothing special about me," or by attempting to hide certain talents 
and skills form others. 
7) The patient may experience themself as separate and unique in such a 
way that enhances their ability to relate to others deeply, 
meaningfully, and empathetically. 
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